Infrastructure and Growth in South Africa: Benchmarking, Productivity and Investment Needs, paper presented at Economic Society of South Africa (ESSA) Conference, Durban, 9/7-9/2005 by Zeljko Bogetic & Johannes Fedderke
Infrastructure and Growth in South Africa: Benchmarking,
Productivity and Investment Needs∗
ˇ Z.Bogeti´ c†and J.W.Fedderke‡
September 17, 2005
Abstract
The paper provides three principal results. First, we benchmark South African infrastructure
performance in terms of access, pricing and quality against international comparator groups of
countries. International benchmarking suggests that, overall, South Africa’s utilities report solid
service at reasonable quality and, in some cases, competitive cost. But there remain signiﬁcant
shortfalls relative to the benchmark of upper middle-income countries, largely related to incom-
plete access and less than expected quality, especially in rural areas. Second, we establish clear
empirical links between infrastrustucture and productivity. Speciﬁcally, infrastructure aﬀects
output directly, while it exerts more limited impact on factor productivity. Finally, the paper
forecasts infrastructure investment needs to 2010. We project an average annual electricity gen-
erating investment requirement for the period 2003-2010 of US$ 0.5 billion or 0.2% of GDP, and
US$ 1.98 billion or 0.75% of GDP for telephony.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Infrastructure investments have long been recognized in the development literature as an inﬂuential
factor of economic growth, working through at least two of the three classic drivers of economic
growth: directly via capital accumulation and indirectly via total factor productivity gains. In-
frastructure investments facilitate private investments by lowering production costs and opening
new markets, thereby creating new production, trade and proﬁt opportunities. Roads reduce trans-
port costs and ports reduce transaction and trade costs. Both expose local ﬁrms to the innovative
pressures of international competition. Aschauer (1989) for example, ﬁnds that road building helped
increase economic growth in the United States. The World Bank’s landmark World Development
Report 1994 highlighted multiple links between infrastructure and development and emphasized how
policy can improve not only the quantity, but also the quality of infrastructure services in developing
countries. Most recently, infrastructure investments were explicitly linked with child health, human
capital accumulation, and the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals (Leipziger et al.
2003). The positive and signiﬁcant correlation between infrastructure accumulation and growth at
the macro level is now well established (Figure 1; also see Leipziger, 2001). At the microeconomic
level, better infrastructure is associated with greater ﬁrm competitiveness, lower poverty, and better
health and education outcomes of the poor. Conversely, infrastructure under-investments may lead
to signiﬁcantly lower growth and worsening social indicators.
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Figure 1: Infrastructure and Growth.
There are several reasons why infrastructure investments in a developing country may be below
levels required for dynamic growth. Many infrastructure investments have characteristics of public
goods–non-exhaustive and non-exclusive in consumption–and, therefore, may be undersupplied by
the private sector in certain circumstances. Macroeconomic and political instability may eﬀectively
cut oﬀ t h es o u r c eo fp r i v a t eﬁnance and the public sector may not be strong enough to pick up the
slack. Moreover, pressures for ﬁscal consolidation often result in cuts in public capital expenditures:
infrastructure investments or maintenance is delayed, making rehabilitation and new investments
more costly in the future. Cutting public capital expenditures is less politically costly than resist-
ing public wage increases. But excessive and lasting cuts in infrastructure investments can be an
ineﬃcient ﬁscal adjustment strategy that may lead to lower capital stock in the future and, there-
fore, lower growth (Easterly and Serven 2002). As a result, infrastructure bottlenecks may develop,
becoming binding constraints to growth (Hausmann et al 2005).
Recent comparative experience from the 1990s shows serious consequences of such underinvest-
ment in infrastructure for economic growth. For example, Easterly and Serven (2004) show that
about one-ﬁfth of Latin American growth underperformance relative to East Asia was directly re-
lated to underinvestment in infrastructure. Also shown was that sub-Saharan Africa’s poor growth
performance was in part related to underinvestments in electricity and telecom infrastructure (Es-
fahani and Ramirez 2003). It is estimated that if Africa had enjoyed Korea’s quantity and quality
of infrastructure, it would have raised its annual growth per capita by about 1 percentage point
(Eustache 2005).
Finally, infrastructure directly aﬀects human welfare and equity across community and income
groups. Urban and rural households in Sub-Saharan Africa–South Africa included–experience
widely diﬀerent access to basic infrastructure services (Figure 2). The lowest household income
groups have no or extremely limited access to electricity, improved water and sanitation, or basic
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Figure 3: Access Across Income Quintiles in Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: Estache (2005).
3The international evidence is mirrored in South Africa. Fedderke, Perkins and Luiz (2005) ﬁnd
a positive impact of infrastructure on aggregate economic growth for South Africa employing time
series analysis. Electricity appears to exert the largest and most robust impact on aggregate growth.
Investment in infrastructure does appear to lead economic growth in South Africa and does so both
directly and indirectly (the latter by raising the marginal productivity of capital); there is also weak
evidence of feedback from output to infrastructure.
In this context, developments surrounding infrastructure in South Africa over the past three
decades are of particular concern and have been the subject of a debate.1 The South African
Reserve Bank (SARB) publishes the economic infrastructure component of South Africa’s gross
ﬁxed capital formation and ﬁxed capital stock of the public sector (both general government and
public corporations). Figure 4 shows both indices measured per capita, and both demonstrate a
long-term deterioration: from the mid-1970s in the case of investment, and from the mid-1980s in
t h ec a s eo fﬁxed capital stock. Speciﬁcally, the investment per capita fell from R1 268 in 1976 to
R356 in 2002 (1995 prices), a collapse of 72%! As a percent of GDP, investment fell from 8.1% of
GDP to 2.4% of GDP, which lies below the international benchmark of approximately three to six
per cent identiﬁed by Kessides (1993: ix). In 2002, 72% of public-sector infrastructure investment
consisted of transport, communication, power and water. The short-lived recovery of infrastructure
investment in the 1990s and the subsequent slump were mainly the result of expansion programs
by the telephone (Telkom) and electricity (Eskom) utilities to extend telephone lines and electricity
to areas which were under-serviced, and the purchase of new aircraft by the national carrier (South
African Airways) (SARB annual economic reports, 1996—2000). In recognition of these trends, the
2005 budget provides for signiﬁcant expansion of investment in infrastructure, at central government,
local government and public enterprise levels.
It is also useful to bear in mind a longer-term history of infrastructure development in South
Africa. Perkins et al. (2005) provides a comprehensive description of particular economic infrastruc-
tural developments in South Africa since 1875. Figure 4, which shows the long-term development of
selected infrastructure measures in the form of indices, provides a summary account, and suggests
a series of sequential periods of infrastructure roll-out in South Africa. The ﬁrst wave of infrastruc-
tural development was railways over the 1875—1930 period, after which there was little change in
the route-kilometer railway line distance — though rolling stock continued to increase. The second
take-oﬀ in infrastructure investment was in inter-city roads, which reached a plateau around 1940,
after which the focus was on the paving of national and provincial roads. In the 1920s and 1930s
growth in road traﬃc far exceeded growth in rail transport, and with the paving of roads after 1940
road traﬃc continued to grow faster than rail for the rest of the century. While ports constitute
South Africa’s oldest form of infrastructure, substantial expansion in port capacity was constrained
up to the 1970s, at which point two new ports two new ports were constructed, doubling the volume
of cargo handled. The ﬁnal phase of infrastructural development was in telephones and electricity.
While the average growth rate for ﬁxed phone lines dropped in the 1960s, it rose again in response
to the introduction of information and cell phone technology.
2O r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e P a p e r
The objective of this paper is threefold. First, we benchmark South African infrastructure devel-
opment against international comparator groups of countries. Objective of the analysis is to place
the level of infrastructructure in South African in a broader context, in order to be able to provide
an assessment of South Africa’s comparative performance. To our knowledge, no such comparative
assessment for South Africa has taken place to date.
Second, we conﬁrm that infrastructure has a long-term growth impact in South Africa. Our
1The following evidence esentially draws from the ﬁndings of Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) and Fedderke,
Perkins and Luiz (2005).
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Figure 4: Historical Evolution of Infrastructure in South Africa. Source: Fedderke, Perkins and Luiz
(2005).
5analysis proceeds by assessing the impact of infrastructure on South African productivity. This
represents an advance on previous ﬁndings in several ways. The paper assesses the productivity
impact not only across a wide range of infrastructure measures, but also at a disaggregated level of
3-digit manufacturing sectors. Our sectorally disaggregated evidence ﬁnds clearer, and more robust
ﬁndings of an infrastructure impact on development than does the aggregate evidence. The paper
also innovates by investigating the impact of infrastructure both on labour productivity, and on
total factor productivity growth. Finally, we employ panel estimators that present an advance on
the literature, since they test both for homogeneity of long-run associations across groups included
in the panel, allow for heterogeneity in the short-run dynamics, also allowing for dynamic rather
than instantaneous adjustment of stocks to long-run equilibrium values.
Third, we forecast future infrastructure demand in both electricity generation and telecommu-
nications. The forecast of estimated demand for electricity generation and telephony is based on
international panel data (52 countries, period 1980-2002) in order to establish long-run equilibrium
forecasts of infrastructure requirements in South Africa, implicitly benchmarked against comparative
international evidence. Using appropriate, available measures of cost, we conclude by forecasting the
investment ﬂows required in order to meet projected infrastructure needs in South Africa in these
two sectors.
Section 3 of the paper presents the international benchmark evidence. Sections 4 and 5 present
the theoretical and econometric frameworks employed in the remainder of the paper. In section 6
we present the empirical evidence Section 7 concludes.
3 Benchmarking South Africa’s Infrastructure Performance
The purpose of this section is to benchmark South Africa’s infrastructure performance against the
relevant group of comparator countries. How does South Africa compare on major indicators of
infrastructure sector performance against the relevant country groups? What do outcome indicators
tell us about the relative strengths and weaknesses of South Africa’s infrastructure vis-à-vis various
income and geographic comparator groups of countries? Where are the largest deviations–positive
and negative—from the benchmarks and other comparators? And how does one interpret some of
these comparisons in order for them to be useful for policy purposes? The answers to these questions
are likely to provide important building blocks towards a more complete assessment of the state of
infrastructure in South Africa, its performance, a n da n yn e e df o rr e f o r m .I tw o u l da l s oh e l pf r a m e
the ongoing discussion in South Africa in a comparative perspective based on well-deﬁned and
widely accepted performance indicators. We hope to contribute to these eﬀorts by focusing here on
the ﬁrst step–international comparison and benchmarking along key dimensions of infrastructure
performance. The benchmarking covers all four major infrastructure sectors: electricity, water,
telecom, and transport. Infrastructure performance is measured using a series of quantitative and
qualitative (technical and perception-based) indicators. Data det a i l sa r ep r o v i d e di nA p p e n d i xA .
The data used for comparing South Africa’s performance comes from the World Bank research
data base that was recently developed with a speciﬁco b j e c t i v et ob eu s e df o rt h i st y p eo fb e n c h -
marking exercise (Eustache and Goicoechea, 2005). The data base pulls together the latest available
observations from a number of well documented, specialized data sources that contain more detailed
data with longitudinal information. The data base aims to measure sector performance by focus-
ing on sector outcomes–access, aﬀordability/pricing, and quality (technical or perceived). It also
provides information on sector institutional reform. Data covers 207 countries (although coverage
varies by sector and indicator)2 with a limited number of variables3 measuring sector outcomes.
2The percentage of available country observations from the total number of countries (207) varies by indicator
from close to 90% for measures of access to roads, 85-95% for ICT access and pricing measure, 75-85% for access to
water, and 60% for access to electricity. The number of quality indicators is generally lower than those of access.
3The numbers of indicators in each sector are the following: 7 in energy, 4 in water & sanitation, 12 in ICT, and
12 in transport.
6For the purpose of benchmarking South Africa, we compare it with all the world geographi-
cal comparator groups—Sub-Saharan Africa, OECD, South Asia, East Asia & Paciﬁc, Middle East
& North Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia, and the world–and
four groups of countries clustered by level of income per capita–low-income, middle-income, upper
middle-income, and OECD countries. Therefore, both region and income level are used as compara-
tor criteria. The main benchmarking group on which much of the analysis is focused is South Africa’s
per capita income group of upper middle-income countries. Because of the strong association be-
tween infrastructure and income level and because this is also South Africa’s main competitor group
of countries, this is economically the most meaningful group comparator for South Africa. This is
supplemented by relevant comparisons with other income groups and major regions of the world to
provide a wider, geographical comparison of South Africa’s infrastructure performance. Finally, we
use from the aforementioned data base the available indicators for electricity (7), water & sanitation
(4), and most of the broader group of indicators for information communication technology (13)
and transport (10). For our purpose, the benchmarking is limited to sector performance indicators.
Detailed benchmarking is presented in Tables 1 through 4. We do not use nor discuss institutional
reform indicators that are also available in the database.
As with any comparative indicators summarizing performance in a vast number of diﬀerent
countries, interpretation of comparisons must be made carefully and taken with caution. Some
of the variations among the indicators may reﬂect other factors that may make single indicator
comparison less revealing, or even misleading. The database itself has its limitations detailed in the
cited World Bank analysis by Estache and Goicoechea. Where appropriate, we explain or qualify
how speciﬁc circumstances in South Africa may aﬀect a speciﬁc indicator comparison. Nevertheless,
since the indicators presented here are widely accepted and fairly unambiguous representations of
major dimensions of sector performance, we believe that the benchmarking and comparisons are
suﬃciently meaningful and could prove useful in both analytical and policymaking studies of South
Africa’s infrastructure performance.
3.1 Energy: Electricity
Overall, South Africa’s performance in the electricity sector (measured by the seven indicators
discussed below) compared to the upper middle-income country benchmark is relatively weak in
terms of access, but favorable in terms of technical eﬃciency (i.e. percentage of losses), pricing,
and perceptions of service. The relatively low access reﬂects in large part the legacy of Apartheid,
that left large segments of the population–especially the poor—outside the network of basic service
provision. Since then, service access has been increasing, but the level remains behind what would
on average be expected, given South Africa’s income level. Low losses reﬂect solid internal technical
eﬃciency of the electricity network. Low prices reﬂect the comparatively low cost of South Africa’s
electricity (produced almost exclusively from coal) and the fact that a good part of the capital
stock has already been depreciated as there has been little investment in the sector over the past
two decades. With signiﬁcant new investments being planned by the state electricity company
(ESKOM) over the coming years, prices are bound to increase. Finally, local perceptions of service
have been rather favorable, but this may reﬂect selection bias in that only customers that do have
service provision responded to this question. The overall picture, therefore, suggests that the main
weakness in South Africa’s electricity sector lies in access which remains limited, and service delivery
to the poor.
The following paragraphs detail the benchmarking of South Africa’s electricity sector according
to speciﬁc dimensions of performance: access, pricing, technical eﬃciency, and perceptions. The
main comparative benchmark remains the group of upper middle-income countries. Comparisons
are also made with OECD countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, and other major regions of the world.
Figure 5 illustrates.
• Access. Not surprisingly, South Africa’s access to the electricity network is superior to the
7South SSA Mid. East South East Asia Latin
Africa & Asia Paciﬁ c America
S. Africa &C a r i b .
Access to Electricity Network (% of Pop) 66 15 88 31 54 79
Households Reporting Access to 65 23 80 39 62 72
Electricity (% of Households)
Energy Use Per PPP GDP 259 364 249 184 212 207
(kg of oil equivalent/1000 PPP dollars, constant 2000)
Electricity average End-user prices (US cents/k/Wh) 3/2 6/5 5/5 10/8
- Residential/non-Residential
Commercial perception of electricity 5.8 4.3 5.1 2.6 4.3 4.2
services (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of public agency 6.0 4.3 6.0 3.8 5.0 4.8
electricity provider (1=worst 7 = best)
Electric power transmission and 8.0 19.0 14.0 22.0 12.0 18.0
distribution losses (% of total output)
Europe & Low Middle Upper High World
Central Income Income Middle Income
Asia Income OECD
Access to Electricity Network (% of Pop) 99 31 85 87 6.0
Households Reporting Access to 99 32 79 74 45
Electricity (% of Households)
Energy Use Per PPP GDP 375 374 246 249 188 275
(kg of oil equivalent/1000 PPP dollars, constant 2000)
Electricity average End-user prices (US cents/k/Wh) 6/6 6/6 8/7 9/7 13/6 9/6
- Residential/non-Residential
Commercial perception of electricity 4.8 2.8 4.7 5.2 6.3 5.0
services (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of public agency 4.8 4.0 5.2 5.3 5.3 4.8
electricity provider (1=worst 7 = best)
Electric power transmission and 18.0 22.0 15.0 14.0 6.0 14.0
distribution losses (% of total output)
Table 1: Benchmarking South Africa’s Infrastructure Performance: Energy
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Figure 5: Benchmarking South African Electricity Provision Internationally.
9South SSA Mid. East South East Asia Latin
Africa & Asia Paciﬁ c America
S. Africa &C a r i b .
Access to Improved Water Sources (% of population) 87 64 85 72 75 90
Access to improved Sanitaiton (% of Population) 67 37 77 48 60 77
Commercial Perception of Water Source (1=worst 7=best) 5.7 4.2 5.6 4.1 4.8 4.7
Households using piped or well water 85 78 89 90 74 75
as main source of drinking water (% of household)
Europe & Low Middle Upper High World
Central Income Income Middle Income
Asia Income OECD
Access to Improved Water Sources (% of population) 87 65 89 93 99 80
Access to improved Sanitaiton (% of Population) 78 41 79 86 100 64
Commercial Perception of Water Source (1=worst 7=best) 4.6 4.0 4.9 5.0 5.2 4.7
Households using piped or well water 83 78 81 80 79
as main source of drinking water (% of household)
Table 2: Benchmarking South Africa’s Infrastructure Performance: Water
rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with 66% of the population having access,4 compared to
15% for SSA. However, South Africa is lagging signiﬁcantly behind–by about a third–its
own income group of upper middle-income countries (87%). This suggests continued, large
segments of the population in South Africa which remains unserved, despite major gains from
expanding the network over the past decade. A related (and corroborating) statistic focusing
on households indicates that about 65% of all households in South Africa report having access
to electricity compared to 23% for the SSA region and 74% upper middle-income countries.
Compared with other regions of the world, South Africa performs better than South Asia and
East Asia Paciﬁc.
• Aﬀordability—pricing. South African average end-user prices (US cents/kwh) are one of
the cheapest in the world at 3 cents for residential and 2 cents for non-residential customers.
By comparison, these user prices in upper middle-income countries are, on average, about 9
and 7 cents, respectively, while SSA rates are 6 and 5 cents. The world average is 9 cents
for residential customers and 6 cents for non-residential customers. In South Africa, the low
user prices do not reﬂect overall underpricing, as is the case in many developing countries with
the attendant quasi-ﬁscal losses. Instead, it is a consequence of the rather low cost structure
of what is considered a very well run state electricity company (ESKOM) and the fact that
part of the capital stock has already been depreciated; hence, the ﬁxed cost component of the
electricity cost/price in South Africa is very low. However, this static picture is going to change
soon. Speciﬁcally, the South African rates are likely to increase over the coming years as the
electricity company, ESKOM, implements its major investment upgrading program aimed at
rehabilitating and expanding its existing capacity and the distribution network. Part of the
ﬁnancing of this investment program will need to come from increased rates to accommodate
higher ﬁxed costs arising from the new investments. When it comes to pricing, this will
require careful thought to the rebalancing/design of tariﬀs to balance the objectives of access,
eﬃciency, revenue and aﬀordability.
• Quality—technical eﬃciency. Measured by the percentage of transmission and distribution
losses, technical eﬃciency of the electricity sector is quite strong. Electric power transmission
4The database observation for South Africa is from 2002. More recent country data suggests an access rate of 70%
(UNDP/World Bank, 2005), but the overall comparative conclusion here remains the same.
10South SSA Mid. East South East Asia Latin
Africa & Asia Paciﬁ c America
S. Africa &C a r i b .
Teledensity (total telephone subscribers/1000 people) 408 99 292 72 172 433
Mainlines Teledensity (mainlines subscribers/1000 people) 107 31 129 35 76 192
Cellular Teledensity (cellular subscriber/1000 people) 364 73 167 37 96 249
Households with own telephone (% of household) 28 4 24 4 9 23
Cost of local call (US cents/3minutes) 15 10 6 4 5 7
Cost of phone call to the US (US cents/3minutes) 58 497 281 536 450 325
Cost of cellular local call (US cents/3 oﬀ -peak minutes) 25 42 52 17 42 57
Commercial perception of telelphone/fax 5.1 4.3 5.8 4.3 5.2 46
infrastructure quality (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of availability 6.3 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.7 5.5
of mobile or cellular telephone (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of Internet 3.6 2.8 3.5 2.7 3.4 2.8
access in schools (1=worst 7 = best)
Commercial perception of postal eﬃ ciency (1=worst 7 = best) 3.3 3.7 4.9 3.3 4.2 3.1
Phone faults (reported 100/mainlines) 48 57 23 97 39 24
Unmet demand (% of main telephone lines in operation) 1 50 26 24 13 17
Europe & Low Middle Upper High World
Central Income Income Middle Income
Asia Income OECD
Teledensity (total telephone subscribers/1000 people) 547 64 468 635 1393 501
Mainlines Teledensity (mainlines subscribers/1000 people) 224 29 193 261 572 213
Cellular Teledensity (cellular subscriber/1000 people) 325 37 280 381 827 296
Households with own telephone (% of household) 43 6 22 13 13
Cost of local call (US cents/3minutes) 7 8 7 9 15 9
Cost of phone call to the US (US cents/3minutes) 325 504 309 305 128 335
Cost of cellular local call (US cents/3 oﬀ -peak minutes) 40 40 49 54 57 49
Commercial perception of telelphone/fax 5.3 3.4 5.3 5.6 6.6 5.5
infrastructure quality (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of availability 6.0 5.0 5.9 6.0 6.7 6.1
of mobile or cellular telephone (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of Internet 3.7 2.1 3.4 3.8 5.4 4.0
access in schools (1=worst 7 = best)
Commercial perception of postal eﬃ ciency (1=worst 7 = best) 4.3 3.1 3.9 4.4 6.2 4.6
Phone faults (reported 100/mainlines) 34 64 25 18 11 37
Unmet demand (% of main telephone lines in operation) 8 47 12 4 0 21
Table 3: Benchmarking South Africa’s Infrastructure Performance: ICT
11South SSA Middle East & South East Asia Latin
Africa North Africa Asia Paciﬁ c America
& Caribbean
Road denesity in terms of 6.1 3.3 4.8 2.4 4.2 5.7
population (road-km/1000 people)
Road denesity in terms of land (road-km/1000 sq km) 227.2 155.7 608.9 544.6 276.4 712.7
Rail denesity in terms of 0.44 0.18 0.1 0.05 0.14 0.33
population (rail-km/1000 people)
Rail denesity in terms of land (rail-km/1000 sq km) 16.5 3.65 5.5 18.79 8.85 14.78
Travel time to work in main 35 34 25 27 36 29
cities (minutes/one way work trip)
Commercial perception of services delievered 5.3 3.7 5.5 3.9 4.4 4.0
by road department/public works (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of port 4.7 3.8 4.1 3.4 3.6 3.1
facilities (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of rail road 4.3 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.1 1.5
services (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of air transport 5.6 4.5 4.9 4.2 4.4 4.2
services (1=worst 7=best)
Paved roads (% of total roads) 21 25 56 38 32 3.6
Europe & Low Middle Upper High World
Central Income Income Middle Income
Asia Income OECD
Road denesity in terms of 8.6 3.0 7.0 9.2 17.3 6.7
population (road-km/1000 people)
Road denesity in terms of land (road-km/1000 sq km) 580.3 181 702 1076.4 1340.4 840.6
Rail denesity in terms of 0.47 0.13 0.4 0.51 0.53 0.33
population (rail-km/1000 people)
Rail denesity in terms of land (rail-km/1000 sq km) 33.22 9.33 23.26 31.33 46.22 23.12
Travel time to work in main 29 33 29 29 32 31
cities (minutes/one way work trip)
Commercial perception of services delievered 3.6 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.0
by road department/public works (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of port 3.6 2.6 3.6 3.8 5.4 4.2
facilities (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of rail road 3.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 4.8 3.4
services (1=worst 7=best)
Commercial perception of air transport 3.9 3.6 4.4 4.5 5.7 4.8
services (1=worst 7=best)
Paved roads (% of total roads) 76 30 52 57 82 50
Table 4: Benchmarking South Africa’s Infrastructure Performance: Transport
12and distribution losses are 8% of total output for South Africa, which outperforms both SSA
(19%) and upper middle-income countries (14%). This performance is more comparable to the
high-income group of OECD countries (6%).
• Quality—perceptions. In terms of commercial perception of electricity service, South Africa
ranks amongst the best with 5.8 rating out of 7 (7=best 1=worst). This compares favorably
with high-income OECD countries (6.3) and is higher than upper middle-income countries
(5.2). South Africa also performs well on commercial perception of public agency electricity
provider with a ranking of 6 out of 7. This ranking is only matched by Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) and is higher than upper middle-income (5.3) and high-income OECD (5.3).
As noted above, however, this may reﬂect a selection bias in that only customers with access
to service would normally respond to this question. In that sense, the indicators of the lack of
access (about 34% of the population) and the generally favorable perceptions of service cover
essentially diﬀerent segments of the population.
3.2 Water & Sanitation
Overall, South Africa’s performance in access to water lags behind its benchmark upper middle-
income group, essentially because of the much lower access in rural areas, and even more so in
sanitation. In terms of the overall average, the quality of the drinking water as measured by the
percentage of households using piped or welled water in the aggregate is better than in its benchmark
group, but this is because of the very high performance on this indicator in urban areas. (The
database does not have information on aﬀordability/pricing.). By contrast, rural households score
lower than the benchmark and also lower than almost all world regions, including Sub-Saharan
Africa. Apparently, while access and quality do not appear to be major problems in urban areas, the
performance in these dimensions in rural areas lags seriously behind most comparator groups. This
favorable urban picture should also be qualiﬁed by the fact that in South Africa, some communities
in urban areas, referred to as “peri-urban” areas (e.g., parts of Soweto, Diepsloot etc.) that may
or may not belong formally or statistically to their larger urban agglomerations, often lack quantity
and quality of basic service, such as water and sanitation. Figure 6 illustrates.
• Access. Overall access to water is below the benchmark upper middle-income countries,
because of the signiﬁcantly lower access in rural areas. Speciﬁcally, the percentage of the pop-
ulation with access to improved water is 87%, which is signiﬁcantly higher than SSA (64%)
but lags behind upper middle-income countries (93%). South Africa compares well to the
broader group of middle-income countries (both lower and upper middle-income) (89%), but is
noticeably below high-income OECD (99%). However, looking at the rural/urban diﬀerences,
rural South Africa (73%) lags far behind the upper middle-income rural average (85%) for con-
ciseness, not shown in Figure 6), while South African urban areas (98%) do better than other
upper middle-income countries (96%). About 67% of the population has access to improved
sanitation, which is almost twice the SSA level and slightly above the world average (64%).
However it is still far behind upper middle-income countries (86%) and high-income OECD
countries (100%).
• Quality–technical. The percentage of households using piped or welled water as main
source of drinking water is 85% for South Africa, which is higher than in upper middle-income
group (82%), East Asia and Paciﬁc (80%), and SSA (78%), but below both Middle East &
North Africa (89%) and South Asia (89%). Once again, however, this ﬁgure masks a stark
contrast between urban and rural areas. The share of rural households in South Africa using
piped or welled water as main source of drinking water is only 65% compared to 98% for urban
areas. Signiﬁcantly, the rural area percentage for South Africa is lower than the comparable
rural household percentages in all the world region, including SSA (71%), except for East
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Figure 6: Benchmarking South African Water Provision Internationally.
14Asia & Paciﬁc and Latin America & the Caribbean which have very similar performance (64%
each); the latter is the region that has been documented as having a signiﬁcant backlog of
infrastructure deﬁciencies that, inter alia, contributed to its low growth (Leipziger, 2001). By
contrast, South Africa’s performance on this indicator in urban areas (98%) is the highest
(together with South Asia) among all world regions and low- and middle-income countries.
• Quality–perception. At 5.7 out of 7, South Africa gets one of the highest ratings in
commercial perception of water service. The rating for high-income OECD countries is 5.2
and SSA (4.2). Again, this may represent the view of the satisfaction with service by the
segments of the population already enjoying access. Also, it may reﬂect the “urban bias” of
the perception indicator with vast diﬀerences between the quality of service in urban versus
rural communities.
3.3 Information and Communications Technology (ICT)
In general, the ICT sector in South Africa displays performance akin to that of the energy and
water with some interesting variations in the prices of various services. At ﬁrst glance, the overall
indicator of access appears good, but supplementary indicators suggest less than expected quality
and major gaps in service delivery, quality, and even access in rural areas. For example, South African
households pay some of the highest local rates in the world, and the low aﬀordability is reﬂected in
low telephone ownership in rural areas. By contrast, oﬀ-peak cellular service and international calls
to the United States are provided at low, competitive prices, catering largely the wealthier segments
of the population. Nevertheless, in the local debate on the cost issue, there are indications that high
international prices prevail for calls to many other destinations. Moreover, quality, as measured by
reported faults per year per 100 mainlines, appears surprisingly low for an upper middle-income
country. Figure 7 illustrates.
• Access. In terms of mainline teledencity, the picture is similar to energy and water whereby
South Africa has better penetration than SSA, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia,
and East Asia Paciﬁc countries but lags somewhat behind middle-income countries and Latin
America & the Caribbean. However, cellular teledencity is reasonably comparable to upper
middle-income countries though it still lags high-income OECD. In terms of household own-
ership of telephones, only 28% of South African households own a telephone, which is much
higher than the upper middle-income benchmark of 13% and comparable ﬁgures for SSA and
South Asia regions, both at 4%, and East Asia Paciﬁc (9%). But it is still a long way from
Europe and Central Asia (ECA) at 43%, suggesting considerable remaining room for growth.
The ownership rates in rural areas, however, are seven times lower (6%) than in urban areas
(43%) in South Africa, making the rural rate mo r ec o m p a r a b l et ot h o s ei nt h ee n t i r eg r o u po f
middle-income countries.
• Aﬀordability—pricing. A 3-minute local call in U.S. cents is one of the most expensive
in the world in South Africa at 15 cents, which is three times the cost in South Asia and
East Asia Paciﬁc and equal to the high-income OECD countries. This reﬂects monopolistic
market structure in local services. Local debate in South Africa has also emphasized high
cost structure, including on the international call market segment. Nevertheless, within the
cellular and international segment, some calls are very competitive. For example, the database
used for this benchmarking shows that in terms of the cost of three oﬀ-peak minute cellular
local calls (25 cents), South Africa is one of the cheapest compared with upper middle-income
(54 cents) and high-income OECD (59 cents) where costs are twice as high. In addition,
an international, 3-minute call to the United States (58 cents) is much lower than in upper
middle-income countries (305 cents) and high-income OECD countries (128 cents).
15Teledensity  
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Figure 7: Benchmarking South African ICT Performance Internationally.
16• Quality–technical. Perhaps surprisingly, reported faults per 100 telephone mainlines (per
year) are very high (48) by upper middle-income (18) country standards and are closer to the
SSA average (57). High income OECD country rates–towards which South Africa may aspire
in this highly globalized sector—are more than four times lower (11%).
• Quality–perception. Interestingly, perceptions of ICT are more closely aligned to the other
indicators of performance. Commercial perception of telephone infrastructures rating is 5.1
out of 7 compared to 6.6 for high-income OECD countries and 5.6 in upper middle-income
countries. Commercial perception of availability of mobile telephones is much higher at 6.3 (vs.
6 for upper middle-income), which is only better in high-income OECD at 6.6. Commercial
perception of internet access in schools is low by high-income OECD standards, 3.6 vs. 5.4
and slightly lower than upper middle-income countries (3.8). Commercial perception of postal
eﬃciency is even worse at 3.3, which is only just above the average for low-income countries
(3.1), and almost half the rating given to high-income OECD and 4.4 for upper middle-income
countries.
3.4 Transport
Transport sector’s overall performance indicators show South Africa lagging behind its comparator
country groups and several other regions. This ﬁnding must be taken with caution though, reﬂecting
at least two factors at play. First, it may simply reﬂect the more idiosyncratic territorial distribution
of population and economic activity in a large, coastal, resource-rich country such as South Africa
than is the case for the average country group. However, it also reﬂects the legacy of the Apartheid
era and wide inequalities in infrastructure stocks and service delivery between the privileged group
and the majority of the population. Perceptions of the quality of service delivery are relatively
favorable. Figure 8 illustrates.
• Access. Road density in terms of population (road-kilometars per 1,000 people) is twice the
average for low-income countries and higher than Middle East & North Africa, and East Asia
Paciﬁc. However, at 6.1 road-km per 1000 people it is only a third of the density of high-income
OECD countries and two-thirds of upper middle-income countries. Interestingly, Brazil has
signiﬁcantly higher road density in terms of population (10), while Indonesia and Malaysia
score lower (1.7 and 2.8). Road density in terms of land (road-kilometers per 1,000 sq km)
is very low (227) when compared with many other groups and is only higher than that of
SSA (155) and low-income countries (181). It is also much lower than in benchmark upper
middle-income countries (328). At the same time, it is important to recognize that these road
density indicators for South Africa may be somewhat misleading in comparative perspective
because of the speciﬁc territorial conﬁguration of population density that is concentrated in
comparatively small parts of an otherwise large national territory. To the extent that South
Africa has lower than average population density and greater diﬀerences in the concentration
of population and economic activity (parts of the country are very poorly inhabited with very
little or no commercial activity) in diﬀerent regions, the indicator may overstate the gap with
comparator countries. For example, South Africa performance on density in terms of land
appears similar to Brazil (203 road kilometers per 1,000 sq km), another resource-rich, coastal
country with vast sparsely populated territory; Indonesia and Malaysia also have very similar
road density in terms of land (203 and 200 road kilometers per 1,000 sq km, respectively).5
Rail lines density in terms of population is very high when compared to SSA, Middle East
& North Africa, South Asia, East Asia Paciﬁc, and Latin America & the Caribbean. It is
slightly higher than the average for all middle-income and just below the benchmark upper-
income group. South Africa’ rail lines density in terms of land, however, is far behind those
5Estache and Goicoechea (2005), Table A4-2, pp. 105-07.
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Figure 8: Benchmarking South African Roads Infrastructure Internationally.
18in middle-income and high-income countries and is also behind South Asia but ahead of other
groups.
• Quality. According to the database, South Africa has one of the lowest percentages of paved
roads at 21%. This is lower than SSA (25%) and low-income countries (30%) and far behind
upper middle-income (57%) and high-income countries (82%). This may reﬂect the legacy of
the strong urban bias and the economic conﬁguration of economic activity inherited from the
Apartheid era. Two important caveats are in order here. First, local information on paved
roads shows a higher percentage (31%) that was already achieved in 1994;6 as of writing, we
could not reconcile this with the number from the benchmarking database that on this indicator
originates in the World Bank’s World Development Report 2004. If the 31% ﬁgure is taken
at face value, it would imply better performance in South Africa than in SSA region, but still
worse than in upper middle-income countries. Second, the quality of the paved roads variable
itself probably hides considerable cross-country variation: paved roads in South Africa may
be of higher quality than those in most SSA countries, but this variation would presumably
be much less relevant for the upper middle-income group. As a result, irrespective of which
ﬁgure is used (21% or 31%), it is safe to say that South Africa compares less favorably with its
benchmark group of upper middle-income countries, and lags signiﬁcantly behind high-income
OECD countries.
• Quality–perception. South Africa has one of the longest travel times to work in main
cities (35 minutes) when compared to upper middle-income (29 minutes), high-income OECD
(32 minutes) and SSA (34 minutes) countries. The world average is 31 minutes. This also
reﬂects the inherited road network from the pre-1994 era that now results in the majority of
the population often facing long and costly commute; in some communities, commuting costs
may reach prohibitive levels as a proportion of the prospective wage, thereby discouraging job
search and earning opportunities for the poor.7 Commercial perception of service delivered by
road department is one of the highest in the world at 5.3, only better in MENA at 5.5. The
average for high-income OECD countries is 4.3. Commercial perception of port facilities, and
railroad services are lower than road but are stillm u c hh i g h e rt h a ni nl o w -a n dm i d d l e - i n c o m e
countries and are not too far behind the ratings of high-income OECD countries. Commercial
perception of air transport services gets the highest ranking of all transport sectors at 5.6,
which compares well with 5.7 for high-income OECD countries.
3.5 Large Diﬀerences from the Benchmark
As a conclusion to the detailed benchmarking of South Africa’s infrastructure performance discussed
above, it might be useful to highlight some of the large diﬀerences–positive and negative–between
South Africa and comparator groups of countries, especially the benchmark upper middle-income
group (Table 2). With appropriate caveats, this selection of indicators showing particularly large
deviations from the benchmark can be taken as indicative of the possible signiﬁcant strengths and
weaknesses in infrastructure performance. Together with the additional, country speciﬁc indicators
and analysis of sectors, it is hoped that this could help focus the attention of policymakers on those
areas where performance improvements are most needed.
In a nutshell, the electricity sector epitomizes the stark duality of the broader South African
economy with a modern “ﬁrst” economy, and the underserved “second”, largely rural economy. As
a result, indicators of internal technical eﬃciency (e.g., losses in distribution/transmission) and low
prices are quite favorable compared with the benchmark country group as well as other comparators.
6See Perkins et al (2005).
7Department of Transport (1999) estimated that based on OHS data for 1995 the average public transport trip in
South Africa was 20km, about twice the length experienced in Asian developing countries. South African commuters
spent about 40% more time travelling than their Asian counterparts.
19South Africa Benchmark SSA World South Africa’s
Upper Middle performance vs.
Income Benchmark
Energy-Electricity
Energy: Access to Electricity Network 66 87 15 60 Lower
(% of Population)
Energy: Households reporting access 65 74 23 45 Lower
to electricity (% of households)
Electricity: Average End-User Prices 3/2 9/7 6/5 9/6 Higher
(U.S. cents/k Wh)
(Residential Non-Energy: Residential)
Energy: Electric Power Transmission 8.0 14.0 19.0 14.0 Higher
& Distribution Losses (% of total output)
Water
Water: Access to Improved Sanatation 67 86 37 6.4 Lower
(% of population)
ICT
ICT: Teledensity 408 635 99 501 Lower
(total telephone subscribers 1000 people)
ICT: Mainlines Teledensity 107 261 31 213 Lower
(mainlines subscribers 1000 people)
ICT: Cost of Local Phone call 15 9 10 9 Lower
(U.S. cents/3 minutes)
ICT: Cost of Phone calls to the U.S. 58 305 497 335 Higher
(US cents/3 minutes)
ICT: cost of cellular local call 25 54 42 49 Higher
(U.S. cents/3 oﬀ -peak minutes)
ICT Phone Faults: 48 18 57 37 Lower
(reported faults 100 mainlines)
Transport
Transport: road density in terms 6.1 9.2 3.3 6.7 Lower
of population (road-km 1000 people)
Transport: road density in terms 227.2 1076.4 155.7 840.6 Lower
of land (road-km 1000 sq km)
Transport: travel time to work in 3.5 29 34 31 Lower
main cities (minutes/one way work trip)
Transport: Paved roads (% of total roads) 21 57 25 50 Lower
Transport: Rail lines density in terms 16.5 31.33 3.65 23.12 Lower
of land (rail-km 1000 sq km)
Table 5: SA’s Infrastructure Performance
20These are comparatively strong dimensions of South Africa’s performance in electricity. However,
indicators of access to network and reported access to service by households fall signiﬁcantly short
of what would be expected of a well-run sector in an upper middle-income country. Clearly, while
much was done in recent years to extend the service to the previously unserved population, much
more remains to be done, especially in rural (and peri-urban) areas.
In water and sanitation, access is much lower than in benchmark upper middle-income countries,
especially in rural areas. Quality indicators also indicate relative shortfalls. To the extent that the
shortfalls reﬂect the internal imbalances between supply and demand for this vital service that is
closely monitored internationally under the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) because of its
multiple links with health and the general wellbeing, expanding access and quality in this sector
may be particularly important.
Similar duality seems to be reﬂected in performance indicators of the information and communi-
cations technology. Pricing of services catering to the wealthier segments of the population and the
large, internationally oriented enterprise sector–cellular calls and some international calls (to the
U.S., for example)–reﬂect generally good and competitively provided services. We note, however,
that in the current debate, broadband speed and access in particular remain a strong area of con-
cern. Arguably, broadband services are of particular concern to economic activity (Reynolds 2005).
Further, local service rates, which may be used relatively heavily by the middle class and the poorer
segments of the population, are among the highest in the world. Moreover, access rates, especially
in poor, rural areas are much lower compared with the benchmark. The implication is that more
could be done to raise competitiveness in the local service segment and generally expand access to
the rural areas.
Finally, in transport, both road and rail, indicators of performance show worse performance than
the benchmark upper middle-income countries. However, with respect to roads these diﬀerences
require more careful interpretation of the evidence, given South African climatic and geopgraphical
peculiarities.While in-depth comparison of a more detailed battery of road indicators of quality and
quantity of service would be needed to draw ﬁrmer conclusions, the indicators presented may suggest
the need for another look at the adequacy of the road and rail network to service the needs of a
growing, upper middle-income countries, including large segments of the rural population.
3.6 Reﬂections on the Benchmarking Evidence
In sum, we have benchmarked South Africa’s infrastructure performance on all four major infrastruc-
ture sectors in terms of key indicators of access, aﬀordability-pricing, and quality using the new World
Bank database of infrastructure sector outcome indicators from 207 countries. The broad results
of the benchmarking are probably not surprising for a reader acquainted with the dual structure
of the South African economy and society. But they do provide a broad international comparative
perspective on the performance of South African infrastructure.
Compared to the benchmark and other country groupings, South Africa’s utilities, overall, pro-
vide solid service at reasonable quality and, in some cases, very competitive prices. But there remain
signiﬁcant shortfalls relative to benchmarks in all infrastructure sectors, largely related to limited
access and less than expected quality, especially in rural areas where large numbers of South Africa’s
poor live with limited or no access to service.
T oc a t c hu pw i t hi t si n c o m eg r o u pi nt e r m so ft h e s e indicators, South Africa will need to improve
access to and quality of electricity and water and sa n i t a t i o ni np r e s e n t l yu n s e r v e da r e a s .I n d i c a t o r s
of transport performance, while less deﬁnitive, point in the same direction. Even in telecom, the
most globalized and “modern” infrastructure sector, access to rural areas seems lacking and pricing
of local services uncompetitive. Moreover, to put it simply, if South Africa is to strengthen its over-
all infrastructure performance, it will need to improve these dimensions’ performance in the sectors
faster than the average country in the upper middle-income group while maintaining or improving
its position in the already strong areas of performance. This will not be easy in competition within a
21group of countries all aspiring to move to much higher levels of income and ambitious poverty reduc-
tion. But catching up with these relative shortfalls may also help South Africa reduce its economic
inequities and poverty rates and, therefore, meet the infrastructure related Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs). It could also help address some of the concerns about South Africa’s external
and industrial competitiveness and service delivery that in good part depends on the eﬃciency and
capacity of network utilities to deliver basic services to population and businesses alike.
4 Theoretical Background
The core rationale for infrastructural investment that emerges from the theoretical literature is that
it raises the marginal product of other capital used in production.
Consider a framework in the spirit of Barro (1990). Posit an endogenous growth model in which
government owns no capital and does not produce services, but purchases private-sector output to
provide productive services which serve as inputs in private-sector production or as consumption
services to households. The services are purchased under a balanced budget constraint, ﬁnanced by
a ﬂat-rate income tax without cost recovery.
By way of condensed illustration, under closed-economy conditions, Cobb-Douglas technology
and homogeneity of degree one, our labor-intensive production function might be:
y = A · gα · k1−α, 0 <α<1 (1)
where y denotes output per worker, A>0 the level of technology, g productive government
expenditure (or services) per worker with no congestion eﬀects, and k an inclusive measure of
private capital per worker. It follows that the marginal products of g and k are, respectively,
∂y/∂g = Aα(k/g)
1−α > 0,a n d∂y/∂k = A(1 − α)(g/k)
α > 0.T h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of infrastructure
on the marginal product of physical capital is clearly illustrated — analogous to the Arrow (1962)
and Romer (1986) learning-by-doing growth models.









/(1 − σ),w h e r ec is consumption per worker, −σ is the elasticity of marginal
utility with respect to consumption (σ>0), and ρ>0 is the constant rate of time preference.
Since the balanced budget constraint imposes a tax rate of g/y, the steady state growth rate,



































consider a policy intervention under which d(g/y) > 0 (given any level of k). From equation (3) it
follows that γ decreases due to the tax eﬀect in g/y, and increases due to the increase in g/k that
is the consequence of the positive eﬀect on the marginal product of k.T h e n e t e ﬀect depends on
which of the two impacts is dominant. Since g/k =( A · g/y)
1/(1−α), and hence d(g/k)/d(g/y) > 0,
it follows from equation (4) that the net eﬀect of d(g/y) > 0 is conditional on the positive but
decreasing ∂y/∂g,w i t hdγ/d(g/y) > 0 for ∂y/∂g > 1, dγ/d(g/y) < 0 for ∂y/∂g < 1,a n dγmax at
∂y/∂g > 1. Thus the capital productivity eﬀect dominates at low g/y,a n dt h et a xe ﬀect at high
g/y.
22A clear, theoretical link between output and government infrastructure investment follows. In-
frastructure expenditure (g) can prevent diminishing returns to scale in private-sector capital (k),
raise the marginal product of private-sector capital (∂y/∂k), and raise the rate of growth of output
(γ). An equally important message is that government intervention of this nature can raise economic
growth only within limits. Once the marginal product of government productive expenditure falls
below unity, further increases in g/y are harmful to economic growth, since the tax eﬀect comes to
dominate the capital productivity eﬀect.
In this section the paper examines two distinct questions. First, we explore whether, to what
extent, and through what channels infrastructure in South Africa impacts on productivity. We do so
by examining two mechanisms explained below. Second, we estiamte and then forecast infrastructure
demand in South Africa to provide an indication of required infrastructure investment over the next
decade. The following subsections outline the relevant methodologies.
4.1 Infrastructure and Productivity
We employ two approaches in establishing the existence of an impact of infrastructure on produc-
tivity.
The ﬁrst examines whether infrastructure has an impact on labour productivity. The speciﬁca-
tion for this exploration is derived from Bogeti´ c and Sanogo (2005). Though the objective of the
Bogeti´ c and Sanogo (2005) is to isolate factors inﬂuencing regional location decisions by industries
intranationally in Côte d’Ivoire, implicit within the model is that infrastructure has an impact on
labour productivity, and hence will inﬂuence decisions on the regional location of industries. The
corollary to this link, which ﬁnds conﬁrmation for Côte d’Ivoire, is that infrastructure at the national
level should certainly impact output per worker. The general speciﬁcation estimated in Bogeti´ ca n d













where Y denotes real value added of industry i in period t, L the size of the labour force, K the size
of the physical capital stock, S a vector of variables measuring scale economies, U urbanization, and
I denotes a vector of variables measuring infrastructural capital stock.
The speciﬁcation provided by equation (5) is explicit in considering public capital stock to be a
factor of production that enters directly into the aggregate production function. Not all models of
the impact of infrastructural investment on output follow this route. In Barro (1990), for instance,
the impact of public capital on output may indeed be direct, or may exercise its inﬂuence by raising
the marginal product of the private sector capital stock. Under this speciﬁcation, infrastructure
would impact not on output per worker, but on total factor productivity.
Given endogenous growth theory, measurement of eﬃciency improvements must be suitably
modiﬁed. A useful overview of the computation of TFP growth under endogenous growth is provided
by Barro (1998). While there are undoubtedly a number of limitations of growth accounting as
a means of isolating technological change, the approach remains in wide-spread use due to the
simplicity and consistency of its internal structure.8
8The literature on growth accounting, its strengths and weaknesses, has come to be vast since the contributions of
Denison (1962, 1967, 1974). The ﬁrst crucial limitation of simple decomposition approaches is that its factor inputs
are not disaggregated by quality classes, with resultant upward bias in TFP measures. See, for instance, Jorgenson
and Griliches (1967), and Jorgenson, Griliches and Fraumeni (1987). Our empirical results reﬂect further on this.
A second limitation attaches to the assumption that factor social marginal products coincide with observable factor
prices. One response to this diﬃculty is provided by recourse to a regression approach, in order to obtain direct
evidence on factor elasticities. However, the regression approach is subject to its own, and severe limitations, since
factor input growth rates are likely endogenous, and factor input growth rates are likely to be subject to considerable
measurement error. Both Hulten (2001) and Bosworth and Collins (2003) conﬁrm the continued usefulness of TFP
computations.
23Perhaps the most signiﬁcant limitation of the simple decomposition approach for present purposes
is the assumption of constant returns to scale. Since endogenous growth theory directs its most
fundamental challenge against traditional growth theory on this very assumption, this constitutes
a fundamental limitation. Fortunately the limitation can be addressed for estimation purposes.
We outline three alternatives corresponding to three alternative conceptions of endogenous growth.

























A captures exogenous technological progress, and β
•
K
K captures the spill-over eﬀect due to the
factor of production with a weight greater than that implied by its income share (here given by α).
An early example of this approach is given by Grilliches (1979), who proxied for
•
K
K by means of R&D
activity. Under the now more conventional approach of Romer (1986), the appropriate growth rate
is in terms of physical capital stock, while the Lucas (1988) speciﬁcation would require additional
augmentation with investment in human capital through which the spill-over channel runs in the
Lucas speciﬁcation.
U n d e raS c h u m p e t e r i a na p p r o a c hw i t ha nincreasing variety of intermediate (capital) goods (de-


























endogenous expansion of intermediate (capital) good varieties (i.e. technological progress). Under




N term coming to denote the overall quality growth rate instead of the variety growth rate. The
only remaining diﬀerence between the two Schumpeterian conceptions relates to the b coeﬃcient.
Under the varieties approach, b can be shown to equal (1 − α) where α has the usual elasticity
interpretation with respect to intermediate inputs, while under the quality ladder interpretation
0 <b<1,w i t hb → 1 associated with “high,” and b → 0 denoting “small” quality diﬀerentials.
The usual proxy for the
•
N
N term under both Schumpeterian approaches is given by the ratio of
the ﬂow of R&D to the market value of the stock of past R&D. While the ﬂow measure is generally
readily available, the stock measure is not. Fortunately, from the relationship given by equation (7)
it can be readily demonstrated that TFP growth is linear in the ratio of the R&D ﬂow measure to
per capita output, easing the requirements of empirical speciﬁcation.12
A remaining problem with the empirical speciﬁcation is that a danger of simultaneity bias con-
tinues to lurk in the above speciﬁcations. Where R&D proves successful in stimulating TFP growth,
ﬁrms have an incentive to respond by raising R&D expenditure further. There is thus no reason
to suppose that R&D activity would not respond to changes in productivity growth. In order to
9For a fuller discussion of this and the following derivations see Barro (1998).
10In the Romer (1990) or Grossman and Helpman (1991: ch3) vein.
11See the discussion in Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991: ch4).
12Thus we can replace R&DF l o w
Market Value of Past R&D with R&DF l o w
Y/L .
24obtain reliable estimation results it is thus important to instrument the R&D measure. The most
generic instruments relate to government policies toward R&D, the registration of patents, and other
variables relating to the general enabling environment for private sector R&D activity.
R&D has found empirical support as a determinant of productivity growth.13 Of course, in-
novation is unlikely to be determined by a single dimension such as R&D activity, however that
is conceived. The empirical and theoretical literature has identiﬁed a range of other relevant con-
ditioning variables,14 including industrial bargaining characteristics,15 product market characteris-
tics (essentially industry concentration),16 labour quality and human capital,17 trade, international
competition or openness of the economy,18 foreign direct investment,19 ﬁnancial liberalization, and
exchange rate overvaluation.20
Here we consider the possibility that infrastructure may similarly aﬀe c tg r o w t hi nT F P . 21
We proceed with an application to South African data.
4.2 Establishing Infrastructure Needs
Fay (2001) and Fay and Yepes (2003) develop a methodology designed to identify the physical needs
in infrastructural stocks. Basis of the methodology is the interaction of a demand for infrastructure,
based on utility maximizing consumers, such that:
IC
j = f (Yj,q I) (8)
where IC
j denotes the consumption of infrastructure by individual j, Yj denotes j0s income, and qI
the price of infrastructure. Proﬁt maximization on the production side of the economy provides the








where Yi denotes the i0th ﬁrm’s output, wi the i0th ﬁrm’s output price, and IP
i the production use
of infrastructure.
This framework leads Fay (2001) and Fay and Yepes (2003) to the formulation of a reduced form













where P denotes population, Yag and Yind the output of the agricultural and industrial sectors
respectively,22 and A denotes technology.
13See for instance Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991), and Hall and Mairesse (1995).
14In addition to the conditioning variables speciﬁed, the literature has also identiﬁed the regulatory environment
as relevant. See for instance the discussion in Pakes and McGuire (1994), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Olley
and Pakes (1996). Since we have data only on ﬁnancial liberalization for South Africa, we do not pursue this line of
enquiry further in this paper.
15See for instance Nickell (1996), Freeman and Medoﬀ (1981).
16See Nickell (1996), Haskel (1991) and Haskel and Slaughter (2001), Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992), Lichten-
berg (1992), McGuckin and Sang (1995), and Jovanovic (1982).
17See for example the ﬁndings in Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), and Entorﬀ and Kramarz (1998). In a somewhat
diﬀerent tradition, see Nelson and Wright (1992) and Fagerberg (1994).
18See Grossman and Helpman (1991), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Coe and Helpman (1995), Coe, Helpman
and Hoﬀmaister (1997), Keller (1998), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Haskel and Slaughter (2001), Mayer (2001),
Sala-i-Martin et al (2004), Bosworth and Collins (2003), Sachs and Warner (1995). See also the discussion in Tybout
(2000) with respect to developing country manufacturing sectors, and Bernard and Jensen (1995), Clerides, Lach and
Tybout (1998), Doms and Jensen (1998), and Bernard and Jensen (1999).
19See De Mello (1997) and Ramirez (2000), and Fedderke and Romm (2005) for an application to South Africa.
20See Rajan and Subramanian (2005).
21An earlier paper employs a symmetrical methodology to investigate a wide range of other impacts on TFP growth
- see Fedderke (2005).
22These are, admittedly somewhat ad hoc, proxies that substitute for the aggregation issues that arise from devel-
oping industry demand from ﬁrm level demand functions.
25Manufacturing Sectors of South Africa included in Panel.
Food Plastics
Beverages Glass & Glass Products
Textiles & Knitting Other Non-metallic Minerals
Wearing Apparel Basic Iron & Steel
Leather & Tanning Basic Non-ferrous Metals
Footwear Fabricated Metals
Wood Machinery & Apparatus
Paper Electrical Machinery
Publishing & Printing Motor Vehicles & Accessories
Basic Chemicals Transport Equipment
Other Chemicals & Fibres Furniture
Rubber Other Manufacturing & Recycling
Table 6: Manufacturing Sectors.
In estimation, Fay (2001) and Fay and Yepes (2003) employ ﬁxed eﬀects estimation, in which
ﬁxed eﬀects are to control for the unobservable aggregate infrastructure price,
qI
w , and technology
dimensions. Application is to Latin America, as well as a wider set of countries.
An alternative approach to establishing an appropriate level of infrastructural expenditure, is
provided by Randolph, Bogeti´ ca n dH e ﬂey (1996). Conditional mean of infrastructural expendi-
ture in their model is determined by a wide range of regressors, including the existing stock of
infrastructure, population density, the urbanization rate, the urban-rural balance, the labour force
participation rate, per capita GDP, the internal and external balances, size of the foreign sector,
terms of trade shifts, debt obligations, the level of institutional development, level and mix of foreign
funding, and the degree of anti-poverty commitment on the part of government.
5 The Data and the Econometric Methodology Employed
5.1 The Data
The empirical work of this paper employs aggregate data for South Africa, manufacturing sector
data for South Africa, as well as data from a panel of countries on which infrastructure data is
available. Choice of the manufacturing data is determined by data reliability.
In the empirical section employing the manufacturing sector data, we employ a panel data set
for purposes of estimation, with observations from 1970 through 1997. The panel employs data for
22 three-digit SIC version 5 manufacturing sectors in the South African economy for which data
is available. The list of sectors included in the panel is that speciﬁed in Table 6. This provides a
22 × 28 panel with a total of 616 observations.23
Variables for the manufacturing sector include the output, capital stock, and labour force vari-
ables and their associated growth rates. For data on TFP growth in South African manufacturing,
we rely on Fedderke (2002).
To control for the market conditions ﬁrms face, and other determinants of productivity, we also
employ:24
23In general, South Africa reports data on 28 3-digit manufacturing sectors. Some of these had to be excluded
from the analysis for reasons of data availability. Television, radio & communications equipment and Professional
& scientiﬁc equipment did not have data on R&D expenditure, while Tobacco, Plastic products, Television, radio
& communications equipment and Other transport equipment lacked data on labour force skills levels. Petroleum
products lacked consistent information on industry concentration.
24A fuller discussion of these data and their quality see Fedderke (2005).
26• The skills mix of the labour force in each manufacturing sector. The ratio is of high and medium
skill levels to unskilled labour. We denote the variable as SKRAT. Since TFP decompositions
in South Africa do not control for changing skills composition of the labour force, it is vital to
control for the skills ratio in any determination of TFP, in order to correct for the resultant
upward bias in the TFP measure.25
• The net export ratio of each manufacturing sector,26 incorporated on the hypothesis encoun-
tered in the literature that export competitiveness may require strong innovative capacity. We
denote the variable as NX.
• R&D expenditure by manufacturing sector is compiled from published survey data on R&D
expenditure. Data is collected for private sector R&D expenditure, public sector R&D ex-
penditure, and expenditure by tertiary educational institutions earmarked for each of the 28
manufacturing sectors.27 All expenditure is real. Fuller detail is provided in the data appendix
to the paper.
• Two measure of industry concentration, given by the Gini index and Rosenbluth index com-
puted for each industry in each year over the sample period. Data is obtained from Fedderke
and Szalontai (2005). We denote the variables GINI and ROSEN respectively.
• The total number of patents registered in South Africa, in order to serve as a proxy for the
quality of intellectual property rights.28 We denote the variable as PATENT.
• An index of property rights in South Africa, as a second proxy for the quality of the property
rights environment. The hypothesis is that the general quality of property rights may impact
on the quality of intellectual property rights.29 We denote the variable as PROPERTY.
• The urbanization rate for South Africa. This data is obtained from the world development
i n d i c a t o r s .W ed e n o t et h ev a r i a b l eU R B .
From Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) we obtain measures of infrastructure capital stock and
investment deﬁned as follows:
• Economic infrastructure:
— Gross ﬁxed capital formation in infrastructure, denoted GFCF (1995 prices).
— Fixed capital stock of infrastructure, denoted FCS (1995 prices).
• Railways:
— Open railway lines, denoted RAIL (route kilometers).
— Locomotives, denoted LOCO (total number steam, diesel and electric).
— Coaching stock, denoted COACH (number).
— Goods stock, denoted GOODS (number).
— Carrying capacity of goods stock, denoted CCAP (tonnes).
— Passenger journeys, denoted RPASS (number).
25See the more detailed discussion of this point in Fedderke (2002).
26Computed as X
X+IM where X denotes exports, and IM imports.
27The surveys are the Resources for R&D surveys undertaken by the Oﬃce of the Scientiﬁc Adviser to the Prime
Minister/President and the Council for Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research (CSIR).
28For details on the construction of this variable see Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz (2001).
29For details on the construction of this variable see Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz (2001).
27— Revenue-earning traﬃc, denoted RFRT.
• Roads:
— Total distance, denoted TRDS (kilometers).
— Paved distance, denoted PRDS (kilometers).
— Passenger vehicles, denoted VEHP (number).
— Commercial (goods) vehicles, denoted VEHG (number).
• Ports:
— Cargo handled, denoted PORTS (harbour tonnes).
• Air Travel:
— Passengers carried by South African Airways, denoted SAA (number).
— International passengers passing through South African airports, denoted APASS (num-
ber).
• Telecommunications:
— Fixed phone lines, denoted FTEL (number).
— Total phone lines (ﬁxed + mobile), denoted TEL (number).
• Power generation: electricity generated, denoted ELEC (gigawatt hours).
5.2 The Econometric Methodology: The Panel Analysis
For the panel data analysis, we employ the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator of Pesaran, Shin
and Smith (1999).
Consider the unrestricted error correction ARDL(p,q) representation:










ij∆xi,t−j + µi + εit, (11)
where i =1 ,2,...,N, t =1 ,2,...,T, denote the cross section units and time periods respectively.
Here yit is a scalar dependent variable, xit (k × 1) a vector of (weakly exogenous) regressors for
group i,a n dµi represents ﬁxed eﬀects. Allow the disturbances εit’s to be independently distributed
across i and t, with zero means and variances σ2
i > 0, and assume that φi < 0 for all i. Then there
exists a long-run relationship between yit and xit:
yit = θ
0
ixit + ηit,i=1 ,2,...,N, t=1 ,2,...,T, (12)
where θi = −β
0
i/φi is the k × 1 vector of the long-run coeﬃcients, and ηit’s are stationary with
possibly non-zero means (including ﬁxed eﬀects). This allows (11) to be written as:








ij∆xi,t−j + µi + εit, (13)
where ηi,t−1 is the error correction term given by (12), and thus φi is the error correction coeﬃcient
measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.
28This general framework allows the formulation of the PMG estimator, which allows the intercepts,
short-run coeﬃcients and error variances to diﬀer freely across groups, but the long-run coeﬃcients
to be homogenous; i.e. θi = θ ∀ i. Group-speciﬁc short-run coeﬃcients and the common long-run
coeﬃcients are computed by the pooled maximum likelihood estimation. Denoting these estimators
by ˜ φi, ˜ βi, ˜ λij, ˜ δij and ˜ θ, we obtain the PMG estimators by ˆ φPMG =
SN
i=1 ˜ φi







N , j =1 ,...,p − 1,a n dˆ δjPMG =
SN
i=1 ˜ δij
N ,j=0 ,...,q − 1, ˆ θPMG = ˜ θ.
PMG estimation provides an intermediate case between the dynamic ﬁxed eﬀects (DFE) estima-
tor which imposes the homogeneity assumption for all parameters except for the ﬁxed eﬀects, and the
mean group (MG) estimator proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), which allows for heterogeneity
of all parameters. It exploits the statistical power oﬀered by the panel through long-run homogeneity,
while still admitting short-run heterogeneity. As long as sector-homogeneity is assured, the PMG
estimator oﬀers eﬃciency gains over the MG estimator, while granting the possibility of dynamic
heterogeneity across sectors unlike the DFE estimator. In the presence of long-run homogeneity,
therefore, our preference is for the use of the PMG estimator.
The crucial question is whether the assumption of long-run homogeneity is justiﬁed, given the
threat of ineﬃciency and inconsistency noted by Pesaran and Smith (1995). We employ a Hausman
(1978) test (hereafter h test) on the diﬀerence between MG and PMG estimates of long-run coeﬃ-
cients to test for long-run heterogeneity.30 Note that as long as the homogeneity Hausman test is
passed in our estimations, we report only PMG estimation results.31
Finally, it is worth pointing out that a crucial advantage of the estimation approach of the
present paper, is that the dynamics generally argued to be inherent in growth processes are explic-
itly modelled, while recognizing the presence of a long-run equilibrium relationship underlying the
dynamics. This is particularly important given the recurrent debate in the context of growth studies
concerning the appropriate length of the time window used in averaging data for cross country stud-
ies. Justiﬁcation for averaging rests on the need to remove short-run ﬂuctuations in growth studies.
Choice of any window is in the ﬁnal instance arbitrary.32 Thus the justiﬁcation for the use of the
PMG estimator is that it is consistent both with the underlying theory of an homogenous long-run
relationship, while allowing for the explicit modelling of short-run dynamics around the long-run
relationship, and the possibly heterogeneous dynamic time series nature of the data in the dynamics
of adjustment.
5.3 The Econometric Methodology: The Time Series Analysis
Estimation is of structural systems by standard time series techniques, with variables that are ﬁrst-
diﬀerence stationary. Johansen33 techniques of estimation are now standard, so that discussion of
estimation methodology here can be brief. We employ a vector error-correction mechanism (VECM)
framework, for which, in the case of a set of k variables, we may have cointegrating relationships
denoted r, such that 0 ≤ r ≤ k − 1. This gives us a k-dimensional VAR:
zt = A1zt−1 + ···+ Amzt−m + µ + δt (14)
where m denotes lag length, a µ set of deterministic components and δ a Gaussian error term.





Γi∆zt−i + Πzt−k+1 + µ + δt (15)
30An alternative is oﬀered by Log-Likelihood Ratio tests. However, the ﬁnite sample performance of such tests are
generally unknown and thus unreliable. We therfore employ the h-test instead.
31The author thanks Yongcheol Shin for the provision of the appropriate GAUSS code for estimation purposes.
32Indeed, some panel studies do not average at all. Unfortunately the estimators used in turn are generally not
dynamic, so that the results obtained may also be driven by short-term ﬂuctuations.
33See Johansen (1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990).
29The existence of r cointegrating relationships amounts to the hypothesis that:
H1 (r):Π = αβ
0 (16)
where Π is pxp ,a n dα,β are pxrmatrices of full rank. H1 (r) is thus the hypothesis of reduced
rank of Π.W h e r er>1, issues of identiﬁcation arise.34 Estimation is by VECM cointegration.
6 Empirical and Estimation Results
6.1 The Impact of Infrastructure on Productivity
As discussed in the theoretical background to the paper, we investigate two separate productivity
impacts of infrastructure. The ﬁrst follows Bogeti´ c and Sonogo (2005) in estimating the impact of
infrastructure on output per worker, in eﬀect allowing infrastructure to enter the aggregate produc-
tion function of the economy directly. The second allows for an indirect impact of infrastructure on
productivity, through TFP growth, within an endogenous growth framework.
6.1.1 The Impact of Infrastructure on Output per Employee
In this section we follow Bogeti´ c and Sanogo (2005) in exploring the impact of infrastructure on
output per worker.












+ βIIi,t + βXXi,t + εi,t (17)
where all variables are as deﬁned as before, Ii,t is provided by a vector of infrastructure measures as
deﬁned in the data section of the paper, and Xit denotes a vector of additional relevant variables.
Here we incorporate a range of additional variables that may be relevant to labour productivity,
including the net export ratio of the industry as an indicator of the openness of the sector, denoted
NXi,t, industry concentration in liu of scale eﬀects, denoted GINIit, the skills ratio of the labour
force, denoted SKRATi,t, and the urbanization rate to account for the possibility of urbanization
economies, denoted URBt.
Estimation is by means of the PMG panel estimator for South African manufacturing sectors.
Results are reported in Tables 7 through 12.
For all speciﬁcations estimation results conﬁrm not only adjustment to equilibrium, but rapid
adjustment (see the ECM-parameters, which correspond to the φ-parameters of equation 11). More-
over, in general the Hausman tests (denoted h-tests) conﬁrm the legitimacy of the PMG estimator
by failing to reject the homogeneity restriction on the long-run coeﬃcients for South African manu-
facturing sectors at conventional levels of signiﬁcance - the only exceptions occur in columns 12 of
Table 9, and 21 of Table 11 in the speciﬁcations controlling for revenue earning rail traﬃca n dﬁxed
telephone lines respectively. Given the unknown ﬁnite sample properties of the LR test statistic, we
thus proceed on the assumption of long-run parameter homogeneity. Finally, we note also that lag
s t r u c t u r ei ss t a b l ea c r o s ss p e c i ﬁcations, while parameter stability, with a few exceptions on which
we comment below, is notable also.
The capital labour ratio proves to have the positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on labour
productivity expected from standard economic theory. The implied constant output elasticity centers
on the 0.3 − 0.4 range, which again conforms to prior theoretical and empirical expectations. The
34See Wickens (1996), Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992), Pesaran and Shin (1995a, 1995b), Pesaran, Shin and
Smith (1996).
35Bogeti´ c and Sanogo (2005) employ the ratio of cumulative investment to employment instead of the capital labour
ratio. Given the availability of capital stock data for South Africa, we employ the direct measure of capital intensity.
30Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L)
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RLL 723.89 660.79 706.50 661.92
ULL 1037.61 848.25 879.91 757.13
LR: χ2 627.43∗ 374.92∗ 346.81∗ 190.41∗
Table 7: Labour Productivity Results I, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square
parentheses below coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, *
denotes signiﬁance at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L)
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RLL 696.43 698.27 696.49 697.36
ULL 838.93 851.79 829.35 825.16
LR: χ2 285.00∗ 307.02∗ 265.71∗ 255.60∗
Table 8: Labour Productivity Results II, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square
parentheses below coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, *
denotes signiﬁance at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
31Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L)
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RLL 699.48 699.17 696.52 699.47
ULL 833.28 846.43 833.70 837.50
LR: χ2 267.60∗ 294.54∗ 274.36∗ 276.05∗
Table 9: Labour Productivity Results III, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square
parentheses below coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, *
denotes signiﬁance at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L)
13 14 15 16





















































RLL 696.43 697.45 700.64 698.29
ULL 814.48 823.79 843.87 848.31
LR: χ2 236.10∗ 252.67∗ 286.46∗ 300.03∗
Table 10: Labour Productivity Results IV, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square
parentheses below coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, *
denotes signiﬁance at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
32Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L)
17 18 19 20





















































RLL 701.27 700.10 696.69 699.36
ULL 836.13 816.80 855.10 832.24
LR: χ2 269.71∗ 233.39∗ 316.82∗ 265.74∗
Table 11: Labour Productivity Results V, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square
parentheses below coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, *
denotes signiﬁance at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
Dependent Variable: ln(Y/L)
21 22 23









































RLL 696.92 696.49 696.63
ULL 846.53 823.84 851.24
LR: χ2 299.24∗ 254.70∗ 309.23∗
Table 12: Labour Productivity Results VI, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square
parentheses below coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, *
denotes signiﬁance at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
33only exceptions occur in the speciﬁcations controlling for paved roads, either passenger of goods
vehicles, and electriﬁcation, for which the output elasticity rises to above unity - a level that is not
easy to credit. High output elasticities also appear in the speciﬁcations that control for railway
rolling stock (lnCOACH, lnGOODS) and telecommunications (lnFTEL, lnTEL).
Industry concentration is consistently found to be statistically insigniﬁcant in estimation. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table 7 reports two alternative speciﬁcations which include the GINI measure of in-
dustry concentration, which both prove to be insigniﬁcant.36
A more surprising ﬁnding is that the skills ratio of manufacturing employment consistently
proves statistically signiﬁcant, but proves to have a negative impact on labour productivity. While
a negative sign is expected in a TFP growth equation (to account for an incomplete accounting
for improvements in labour productivity), the ﬁnding is more diﬃcult to explain in the context
of output per worker. One possible interpretation may be that the long history of South African
underinvestment in human capital37 may have come to create a supply side constraint on industries
that rely on a strong complementarity between human and physical capital. The negative sign on the
skills ratio may be a reﬂection of the fact that industries with a strong human capital requirement
have not been able to hire the requisite form of labour, and have therefore maintained a lower
investment rate. Thus the poorly conceived educational policies of past South African governments
may have served to generate the additional negative consequence of lowering investment in knowledge
intensive sectors of the economy. While we remain uncertain as to the precise interpretation of
t h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient, its consistent statistical signiﬁcance suggested its inclusion in estimation
throughout.
Net exports consistently have a positive impact on labour productivity in the manufacturing
sectors in South Africa, and the variable is statistically signiﬁcant throughout. Parameter stability
across the estimated speciﬁcations holds in general, with estimated coeﬃcients of approximately
0.15. The NX measure spans the range from −0.97 to 0.84 in the study sample. Thus an increase of
0.1 in the NX measure constitutes an increase of approximately 5% in the net export ratio over the
total sample range in South African manufacturing. For a parameter value of 0.15, the implication
is that labour productivity would improve by 1.5% per annum due to the 0.1 (5% of sample range)
improvement in the net export ratio, suggesting a fairly sensitive response to international exposure
of the South African manufacturing sectors.38 Learning opportunities from exposure to international
m a r k e t st h u sa p p e a rt ob es i g n i ﬁcant for South African manufacturing.39
Finally, results conﬁrm the presence of a consistent, and economically signiﬁcant impact of in-
frastructure on labour productivity.
The two aggregate measures of economic infrastructure, lnGFCF and lnFCS, carry negative
and positive signs respectively, suggesting that while infrastructure investment (lnGFCF) carries
ac r o w d - o u te ﬀect with respect to private sector labour productivity, this eﬀect is not persistent,
since the impact of the infrastructure capital stock is positive. Moreover, at an elasticity of −0.05
the negative impact on labour productivity is economically small. On the other hand, only the
infrastructure investment measure proves to be statistically signiﬁcant.
The railway measures consistently report not only a positive elasticities with respect to labour
productivity, but often prove to be strongly related to labour productivity. In only two instances
are the measures of railway infrastructure statistically insigniﬁcant, for the number of locomotives
(lnLOCO) and number of railway passenger journeys (lnRPASS). The extensiveness of the railway
network (the kilometers of railway track - lnRAIL) returns a very strong labour productivity elasticity
36The alternative Rosenbluth measure of industry concentration proved similarly insigniﬁcant. We also employed a
number of alternative speciﬁcations including industry concentration measures, which consistently proved insigniﬁcant.
We therefore report the more parsimonious speciﬁcations excluding industry concentration for the remainder of this
section.
37See the more detailed exposition in Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2000, 2003), and Fedderke and Luiz (2002).
38Note that the implication is of a variable elasticity over the sample range.
39This conﬁrms the ﬁnding already established in Fedderke (2005), though in the latter paper the focus is on TFP
growth.
34of 1.16, and the carrying capacity of goods stock (lnCCAP) is also strong at approximately 0.6.E v e n
the two statistically signiﬁcant elasticities for the goods stock (lnGOODS) and revenue earning traﬃc
(lnRFRT) are relatively strong at approximately 0.4 and 0.2 respectively.
By contrast to the rail infrastructural measures, the measures of road infrastructure employed
by this study are either statistically insigniﬁcant (total roads - lnTRDS), or report a statistically
signiﬁcant but perverse impact on labour productivity. The impact of paved roads (lnPRDS) is
particularly strong at a negative unitary elasticity, but both the number of passenger (lnVEHP) and
goods vehicles (lnVEHG) have strong negative elasticities of approximately −0.50 also. This result
deserves further study. Our preliminary conjecture is that this may reﬂect the territorial distribution
and expansion of roads in part driven by non-economic objectives of the Apartheid era.
The remaining transport infrastructure measures all report positive labour productivity elastici-
ties. Both the cargo handled by ports (lnPORTS) and air passenger traﬃc (lnSAA) have statistically
signiﬁcant elasticities in the 0.2 − 0.3 range, and only aggregate air passenger traﬃc (lnAPASS) is
statistically insigniﬁcant (the elasticity remains positive, though economically negligible at 0.04).
In contrast to the aggregate ﬁndings for South Africa,40 electricity generation is negatively, sta-
tistically signiﬁcantly, and economically strongly related to labour productivity in the manufacturing
sector of South Africa, with an elasticity of −0.4.
Finally, all telecommunications measures (lnFTEL for ﬁxed lines, and lnTEL for total telephone
connections) and the urbanization rate (URB) in South Africa prove to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
In summary, therefore, the ﬁndings on the impact of infrastructure on South African manufac-
turing sector labour productivity suggest that both statistical and economic signiﬁcance attaches
to transport infrastructure in various dimensions. Strong positive impacts on manufacturing labour
productivity appear to attach to railway and ports infrastructure, while roads infrastructure have
t h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect, and telecommunications have little impact.
6.1.2 The Impact of Infrastructure on TFP Growth
In our empirical investigation of an impact of infrastructure on TFP growth we proceed with an
estimation of the empirical speciﬁcation provided by equation (7). As discussed above, this requires
regression of growth in total factor productivity on the ratio of R&D expenditure to per capita
output.41 While the literature also suggests a range of additional factors relevant to the determina-
tion of productivity gains,42 including labour market conditions, labour quality and human capital,
industry concentration, exposure to international competition, foreign direct investment, ﬁnancial
liberalization, and exchange rate overvaluation, these are dealt with in a separate paper,43 and here
we deal strictly with the impact of infrastructure.
Therefore, we estimate a baseline speciﬁcation given by:






+ βSKSKRATit + βNXNXit + βGGINIit + βZZt + εit (18)
where Zt denotes a vector of the various measures of infrastructure identiﬁed in the data section.44
A ﬁnal estimation issue concerns the possibility of simultaneity bias attaching to the R&D
Y/L variable
identiﬁed in the theoretical discussion. To address this problem we instrument the R&D
Y/L variable.45
40See Fedderke, Perkins and Luiz (2005).
41There is some debate about whether the appropriate productivity measure is provided by labour productivity
or total factor productivity. The TFP measure is generally preferred since Y/L may increase due to a rising K/L,
without technology changes. TFP growth provides more direct information on growth due to technological change,
a n di st h em e a s u r ee m p l o y e dh e r e .
42Bartelsman and Doms (2000) provides a useful overview of the issues beyond the literature already cited above.
43See Fedderke (2005).
44Note that all of these dimensions are generic to the economy, rather than industry-speciﬁc.
45Adequate instruments should be correlated with the private sector R&D variable, but not the TFP term. Public
and tertiary R&D is employed in the current study, since they are likely to show association with the R&D activity of
the private sector, but would not be associated with the innovation in production of the private sector. Correlation of
35While the regressor in equation (18) is constructed with private sector R&D expenditure, we employ
SURE estimations46 in order to instrument the private sector R&D expenditure ratio on public
sector R&D activity and tertiary educational institutions’ R&D activity within each manufacturing
sector.47 We report the results of the SURE estimations in Table 13. Reported χ2 test statistics
based on equation and system log likelihoods conﬁrm the presence of non-diagonal error covariance
matrices throughout, conﬁrming the appropriateness of SURE estimation.
Estimation of equation (18) is reported in Tables 14 through 18. Results again conﬁrm rapid
adjustment to equilibrium (see the ECM-parameters, which correspond to the φ-parameters of
equation 11), and in general the Hausman tests (denoted h-tests) conﬁrm the legitimacy of the
PMG estimator by failing to reject the homogeneity restriction on the long-run coeﬃcients for
South African manufacturing sectors at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. There are ﬁve exceptions
to the homogeneity ﬁnding, in the speciﬁcations controlling for paved roads, passenger and goods
motor vehicles, and telecommunications (columns 11, 12, 13, 17 and 18).
A number of the results are symmetrical to those reported in Fedderke (2005). First, results
conﬁrm the presence of a positive impact of R&D expenditure on growth in total factor produc-
tivity, as postulated by Schumpeterian theory. The coeﬃcient on the instrumented R&D measure
is consistently positive, and is statistically signiﬁcant in all but one speciﬁcation (that controlling
for railway locomotives, column 4 of Table 14). In general the R&D coeﬃcient proves robust to
alternative speciﬁcations,48 a n di nm o s ts p e c i ﬁcations lies in the range from 0.03 to 0.06.T h u s
the ﬁndings conﬁrm the presence of a positive, and consistent impact on output growth of inno-
vative R&D activity undertaken by the private sector. Indeed, the only concern with this set of
r e s u l t si st h a tt h ei m p a c to ft h eR & Da c t i v i t yi sp o tentially too strong to be plausible, since the
stable coeﬃcient range implies a more than proportional impact of R&D on TFP growth. Given the
uncertainties surrounding R&D success, this is surprising, and likely implausibly large.
Second, the variable controlling for the skills composition of the labour force, SKRAT, corrects
the TFP measure for its upward bias that results from not correcting the underlying decomposition
for improving skills levels. Accordingly, the impact of the SKRAT variable proves to be consistently
negative, as well as statistically signiﬁcant in all estimations. What is more, parameter-values are
consistently in the −0.03 to −0.05 range.49 The inference is that the TFP decomposition does serve
to bias upward the measure of technological progress, with at least some of the eﬃciency gain in
production proving attributable to increasing skills levels in the labour force.
Third, net exports consistently have a positive impact on the innovative activity of the man-
ufacturing sectors in South Africa, though in four of the estimated speciﬁcations the measure of
exposure to international competitive forces proves to be statistically insigniﬁcant.50 Parameter
stability across the estimated speciﬁcations is less dramatic than in Fedderke (2005), but the range
of parameter values spans a narrow range from 0.03 to 0.10. The NX measure spans the range
from −0.97 to 0.84 in the study sample. Thus an increase of 0.1 in the NX measure constitutes
an increase of approximately 5% in the net export ratio within sample. For a parameter value of
government and tertiary R&D with private sector R&D is 0.44 and 0.31 respectively; correlation of the two instruments
with TFP is 0.01 and 0.02 respectively, conﬁrming our prior.
46SURE estimation is appropriate on the assumption that contemporaneous correlation of disturbances attaching to
growth in total factor productivity across manufacturing sectors may be non-zero - a reasonable assumption conﬁrmed
by relevant diagnostics. Given that we have separate R&D expenditure ﬁgures for private, public and tertiary sectors
across manufacturing sectors, SURE promises eﬃciency gains over single equation estimation.
47Note, some sectors did not have data on public or tertiary sector R&D expenditure data available. For these we
instrumented on either PATENT (marked †) or PROPERTY (marked ‡).
48There are three exceptions, higher coeﬃcient estimates in the speciﬁcations controlling for lnGOODS and lnAPASS
(columns 6 of Table 15 and column 16 of Table 17), and a lower coeﬃcient in the speciﬁcation controlling for lnTRDS
(column 16 of Table 17).
49There are two exceptions: for the speciﬁcations controlling for locomotives and total roads in columns 4 of Table
14 and 10 of Table 16.
50In the speciﬁcations controlling for gross infrastructural capital formation (column 1 of Table 14), railway passenger
journeys (column 8 of Table 15), passenger vehicles (column 12 of Table 16), and ports (column 14 of Table 17).
36Dependent Variable: Private Sector R&D
































































































































Table 13: Results of SURE Instrumenting Estimation, Figures in round parentheses represent stan-
dard errors.
37Dependent Variable: Growth in Total Factor Productivity
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RLL 593.68 591.10 591.11 590.24
ULL 853.43 884.01 840.75 879.09
LR: χ2 519.49∗ 585.81∗ 499.29∗ 577.70∗
Table 14: TFP Results I, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square parentheses below
coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, * denotes signiﬁance at
the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
38Dependent Variable: Growth in Total Factor Productivity
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RLL 588.81 590.83 588.67 589.21
ULL 868.86 849.45 872.98 879.48
LR: χ2 560.10∗ 517.25∗ 568.61∗ 580.54∗
Table 15: TFP Results II, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square parentheses be-
low coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, * denotes signiﬁance
at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
39Dependent Variable: Growth in Total Factor Productivity
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RLL 588.74 599.25 595.95 593.53
ULL 831.12 947.02 845.97 860.18
LR: χ2 484.75∗ 695.55∗ 500.04∗ 533.29∗
Table 16: TFP Results III, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square parentheses be-
low coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, * denotes signiﬁance
at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
40Dependent Variable: Growth in Total Factor Productivity
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RLL 593.05 589.61 588.67 591.60
ULL 842.65 852.14 869.65 863.63
LR: χ2 499.21∗ 525.05∗ 561.95∗ 544.05∗
Table 17: TFP Results IV, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square parentheses be-
low coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, * denotes signiﬁance
at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
41Dependent Variable: Growth in Total Factor Productivity
17 18 19
















































RLL 592.04 592.04 592.94
ULL 862.40 868.49 850.72
LR: χ2 540.71∗ 552.90∗ 515.56∗
Table 18: TFP Results VI, Figures in round parentheses are standard errors, Square parentheses be-
low coeﬃcients Hausman tests, Other square parentheses are probablity levels, * denotes signiﬁance
at the 5 percent level of signiﬁcance.
0.05, the implication is that output growth would improve by 0.5% per annum through the TFP
channel due to the 5% i m p r o v e m e n ti nt h en e te x p o r tr a t i o ,s uggesting a fairly sensitive response
to international exposure of the South African manufacturing sectors. Learning opportunities from
exposure to international markets thus appear to be signiﬁcant for South African manufacturing.
Fourth, increased concentration proves to lower TFP growth, regardless of whether the concen-
tration measure is the GINI or the ROSEN.51 The impact of industry concentration is consistently
negative, though for approximately half of the speciﬁcations it proves statistically insigniﬁcant.
Where statistically signiﬁcant, parameter values generally centre on approximately −0.3.T h ew i t h i n
sample range of the GINI variable is from 0.69 to 0.99, such that for the parameter value of −0.3
the implication of a reduction of the concentration measure of 0.1 (1/3 of the in-sample range of the
GINI measure), would generate 3% more output growth per annum through the TFP channel.
These results closely mirror those already reported in Fedderke (2005). What is new in the
present paper, are the results to emerge from the infrastructure measures.
In general, the estimated results diﬀer sharply from those reported for the labour productivity
speciﬁcations of the previous subsection.
The striking feature of the infrastructure coeﬃcients is that they are almost uniformly negative -
suggesting a negative impact of virtually all forms of infrastructure on eﬃciency gains as measured
by TFP. The only exceptions to this are three infrastructure measures that prove insigniﬁcant
statistically, coaching stock (column 5 of Table 15), revenue earning freight (column 9 of Table 16),
and SAA ﬂight passengers (column 15 of Table 17), and three infrastructure measures which are the
only measures which appear to have a positive impact on TFP growth. Goods rolling stock (column
6 of Table 15), total roads (column 10 of Table 16) and ports (column 14 of Table 17).
51We report only the GINI results. Rosen results are entirely symmetrical, and available from the authors on
request.
42None of the positive impacts is economically strong, with the highest elasticity reaching no more
than 0.15. By contrast, the negative elasticities attaching to some of the alternative infrastructure
measures, is considerably higher, notably the negative elasticity of −0.6 a t t a c h i n gt ot h er a i l w a y
network.
The evidence thus suggests that infrastructure is not a strong source of eﬃciency gains in the
South African manufacturing sector as measured by TFP growth. This evidence stands in strong
contrast to the pervasive and often economically powerful positive impact that infrastructure in
South Africa appears to have had on manufacturing sector labour productivity.
One possible inference to draw from this evidence, is that the impact of infrastructure in South
African manufacturing is directly on output per worker as a distinct factor of production - rather
than indirect in fostering the productivity of private sector capital.
6.2 Estimating the Infrastructure Needs in South Africa
We next turn to the question of particular interest for policy: estimating demand for infrastructure
services and based on these estimates, exploring the possible infrastructure needs that will need to
be ﬁnanced over the period of 2003-2010.
With respect to estimating the demand for infrastructure, we employ international panel data
on 52 countries for the period 1980-2002 in order to estimate the infrastructre demand equation
provided by equation (10). The estimator employed is again the pooled mean group estimator
outlined in section 5.2. We limit the analysis to electricity generation and telecom lines since suitable
international panel data suﬃciently long in the time dimension was not consistently available for
other forms of infrastructure. Here, we provide a more detailed presentation of the estimation issues
and the resultant data implications in the following discussion.
Having projected the physical measures of electricity and telephone infrastructure, we obtain
U.S. dollar values of required investment ﬂows in the two sectors by using appropriate, available
measures of the cost of infrastructure.
6.2.1 Forecasting Required Stocks of Infrastructure and Associated Investment Flows
We base our prediction of the required stocks and ﬂows of infrastructure on an estimated long-run
demand using a 52-country panel. The list of countries in the panel is listed in Appendix B. Justiﬁ-
cation for the use of international data is in the spirit of providing a benchmark against comparable
country experiences. Advantage of the PMGE methodology is that the implicit assumption of ho-
mogeneity across the panel is explicitly tested for. The panel of countries was also limited to low-
and middle-income countries, in order not to bias estimated infrastructure demand upward through
the inclusion of high-income countries.







= α + βy lnYPC i,t +
3 X
k=1
βkYS i,t + δZi,t + εi,t (19)
where I denotes the relevant infrastructural measure (electricity, total telephone lines),52 P popula-
tion, YPCper capita real GDP, YSsectoral shares in GDP, where we consider agriculture (YA G ),
manufacturing (YMA N) and services (YSER V), and Z denotes a vector of additional explanatory
variables.
Table 19 reports estimation results for the two long-run relationships. Results conﬁrm adjustment
to equilibrium (see the ECM-parameters, which correspond to the φ-parameters of equation 11),
though unsurprisingly for infrastructure the adjustment to equilibrium is relatively slow, particularly
in the case of telephones. The Hausman tests (denoted h-tests) conﬁrm the legitimacy of the PMG



































LR: χ2 843.79∗ 796.77∗
Table 19: Estimates of Long-Run Demand for Electricity and Telephones
estimator by failing to reject the homogeneity restriction on the long-run coeﬃcients across our panel
of 50 countries. The log likelyhood statistics suggest a relatively high level of ﬁt.
Both estimations return an income elasticity that lies above unity. In the case of electricity
demand, the elasticity of 1.4 is comparable to other international ﬁndings. For instance, the World
Development Report (1994) reports electricity income elasticities varying between 1.6 and 1.7, while
Fay (2001) reports a power elasticity for Latin America of approximately 1.1. The telephone elas-
ticity of approximately 1.2 is again comparable to other international evidence, with the World
Development Report (1994) again reporting a 1.6 to 1.7 elasticity range for telephones, while Fay’s
(2001) Latin American elasticity is approximately 1.0. Given that the WDR (1994) data sample did
not extend beyond the late 1980’s, our estimated elasticities are thus relatively close to the study
using more recent data (Fay’s data sample extends to 1995).
The share of agriculture reports a negative and statistically signiﬁcant association with the two
per capita infrastructure measures. While Fay (2001) reports positive coeﬃcients on YAG for Latin
America, the broader panel of Fay and Yepes (2003) reports results consistent with ours. Given that
a declining share of agriculture in GDP is associated with industrialization and urbanization, with a
rising share of economic activity and of households more intensive in electricity and telephone use,
t h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient is plausible.
The share of manufacturing in output is positively related to per capita electricity, but negatively
related to per capita telephone use. Given the relative energy intensity of manufacturing, the
electricity result is intuitively plausible. One possible reason for the negative coeﬃcient for the
telephone per capita estimation, may be the existence of a threshold eﬀect in the association - with
demand initially rising rapidly in manfacturing activity, but at a sharply decreasing rate.53 The net
eﬀect may thus be a plateau of demand by manufacturing.
For the telephone speciﬁcation, we added both the share of services in output, and controlled
for a structural break in telephone provision in 1996. The ﬁrst augmentation of the speciﬁcation is
justiﬁed on the grounds that service sectors are likely intensive in the use of telephones, while the
53The essential intuition here is straightforward: manufacturing activity may require a relatively ﬁxed number of
lines per establishment, making the association with the level of value added strongly non-linear.
44Unit Cost of Infrastructure: Electricity and Telecom
Sector Unit Cost
Power:
Lower Bound: $0.021 per kwh
Upper Bound: $0.037 per kwh
Telecom $1,000 per telephone mainline
Lower bound represents long run marginal cost of generation. Figure may
be underestimate since it is based on projected demand growth that the
present study suggests may be an underestimate.
Upper bound represents long run marginal cost of generation adjusted for
average cost of generation. Upper Bound = 1.8 × Lower Bound.
Table 20: Source for Telecom Cost: Fay (2001), Source for Electricity Cost: National Integrated
Resource Plan (2002).
1996 structural break corresponds to the introduction of mobile phone technology, which is reﬂected
in a marked change in the rate of increase in telephone lines in most of the countries included in our
panel.54 The service sector share in GDP has the predicted positive impact on per capita telephone
use, while the structural change also proves signiﬁcant implying a permanent acceleration in the
growth rate in per capita telephony of 1% per annum.
The panel estimator forms the basis for our forecast of electricity and telephony demand for
South Africa.55 Having projected the physical measures of electricity and telephone infrastructure,
we obtain U.S. dollar values of required investment ﬂows in the two sectors. For electricity, we used
the average projected long-run marginal cost of power generation (National Integrated Resource
Plan 2002) for the period 2005-2010. Due to some uncertainty about the precise projected unit cost
of electricity generation, we used lower bound estimate of the average long run marginal cost for
the period 2005-2010 (US$2.1 cents) and an upper bound estimate (US$3.7) based on the LRMC at
the end of the projection period. For telecom, we used the best practice international unit cost (See
Table 20)
Our forecast of infrastructure stocks indicate that the stock of generating capacity would grow
from 4815.47 kwh per capita in 2002 to 5418.23 kwh par capita in 2005, reaching 6453.19 kwh per
capita in 2010. The average annual forecast growth rate for electricity stock based on the estimated
long-run relation during 2003-2010 is 3.7%. See Figure 9.
For telecom, our model forecasts the growth in total telephone lines per 1000 of population from
410 in 2002 to 474 in 2005, and then 664 in 2010. The implied growth rate in the period 2003-2010 is
6.0%. For comparison, a similar exercise for Latin American upper middle-income countries resulted
in telephone lines of 255 per 1000 of population (Fay 2001). See Figure 9.
The estimates represent projected expansion in infrastructure stocks, and do not say anything
about possible need for rehabilitation or upgrading or operations and maintenance expenditures.
Hence both the physical and derived dollar value of required investments are likely to be lower-
bound estimates.
To translate forecast stocks of infrastructure into dollar values of required investment ﬂows, we
follow the simple approach earlier applied by Fay (2001) in estimating infrastructure ﬁnancing needs
in Latin America. We calculate the investment needs as the total change in projected physical stocks
multiplied by the cost of infrastructure as explained above (Table 20). Unit costs in Table 20 were
inﬂation-adjusted over the period of projection for an average annual inﬂation rate of 4%.
Using this method, we predict that total value of the electricity generating stock employing the
54Note that previous studies did not include time periods subject to the structural change.
55Note that the forecast employs South Africa speciﬁc dynamics in addition to the long-run coeﬃcients reported
above. The full speciﬁcation is available from the authors on request.
45South Africa: Projected Stocks and Flows of Telephone Lines, 2003-2010
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Stock of Electricity Generation --  left scale Change in Electricity Generation -- right scale
Figure 9: 2003 - 2010 Forecast of Infrastructure Demand: Electricity & Telephony
South Africa- Estimated Required Investment in Infrastructure, 2003-2010
Average Annual Investment Flows
Sector (in billions of US$) (in billions of rand) (in % of GDP)
Power:
Lower Bound: 0.29 1.87 0.11
Upper Bound: 0.52 3.37 0.20
Telecom: 1.98 12.90 0.75
TOTAL (upper bound): 2.50 16.27 0.95
Source: The authors’ estimates.
Table 21: Investment Needs Forecast, 2003 - 2010
46South Africa: Projected Cost (including associated network costs) of Electricity Production Capacity and 
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Long-Run PMGE forecast--stocks Long-Run PM GE forecast--flows
Average annual investment flows, 2003-
2010: US$ 0.5 billion upper bound
South Africa: Projected Cost of the Stock and Flow (Investments) of Fixed Line and Mobile Phone 
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Long-Run PMGE forecast -- stocks Long-Run PMGE forecast -- flows
Average annual investment flows 2003-
2010: $1.98 billion
Figure 10: 2003 - 2010 Forecast of Cost of Infrastructure Demand: Electricity & Telephony
47lower bound cost structure is going to increase from US$ 4.03 billion (R 26.21 billion) in 2002 to US$
5.29 billion (R 34.38 billion at an exchange rate of R6.5/$1) in 2005, and then to US$ 8.13 billion
(R 52.87 billion) in 2010. Therefore, required average annual investments – changes in stocks –
in electricity over the period 2003-2010 are of the order of $ 0.29 billion (R 1.87 billion) (See Table
21, and Figure 10).
Using the upper bound cost structure, we predict that total value of the electricity generating
stock is going to increase from US$ 7.26 billion (R 47.17 billion) in 2002 to US$ 9.52 billion (R
61.88 billion at an exchange rate of R6.5/$1) in 2005, and then to US$ 14.64 billion (R 95.18 billion)
in 2010. Therefore, required average annual investments – changes in stocks – in electricity over
the period 2003-2010 are of the order of $ 0.52 billion (R 3.37 billion) or about 0.2% of GDP (See
Table 21 and Figure 10). Again, note that this covers only generation, excluding transmission and
distribution and operations and maintenance expenditures.
Similarly, the value of the stock of total telephone lines is going to increase from US$ 16.5 billion
(R 107.2 billion) in 2002 to US$ 22.3 billion (R 145 billion) in 2005, and then to US$ 40.3 billion (R
262.2 billion) in 2010. Required average annual investments in telecom in the period 2003-2010 are
therefore of the order of $ 1.98 billion (R 12.9 billion) or about 0.75% of GDP (See Table 21 and
Figure 10). Taken together, investment needs in electricity generation and telephone lines are of the
order of US$2.5 billion (about 1% of GDP).
7C o n c l u s i o n
The following ﬁve conclusions arise from this analysis.
First, new investments in infrastructure are required in South Africa to reverse the investment
decline from the past several years and build the new capacity required to support accelerated
growth, competititveness, poverty reduction and more rapid economic and social integration of the
society.
Second, international benchmarking of infrastructure performance suggests solid service at rea-
sonable quality compared to relevant benchmarks and, in some cases, very competitive prices. But
there remain signiﬁcant shortfalls relative to benchmarks in all infrastructure sectors, largely related
to limited access and less than expected quality, especially in rural areas where most of the poor
reside.
Third, our econometric estimates suggest that infrastructure inﬂuences productivity in South
Africa directly as a factor of production and less via the total factor productivity (TFP) channel.
Fourth, we estimated a long-run dynamic model of demand for electricity and telecom using panel
data on 52 countries for the period 1980-2002; the model performs well in characterizing historical
demand. And we use the model to project demand forward in the 2003-2010 period in order to derive
preliminary preliminary estimates of the cost of required new investments in electricity generation
and telephone lines.
Fifth, the estimates of required investments to meet demand in electricity generation and tele-
phones are as follows:
Electricity (generation): US$0.5 billion per year
Telephone lines: US$1.98 billion per year
Finally, we hope that this analysis will contribute to the debate on infrastructure and constraints
to growth in South Africa, as well as discussions about the likely investment requirements in these
important infrastructure sectors.
488 Appendix A: Benchmarking Data Sources and Descrip-
tions
Energy Performance Indicators 
ACCESS 
Indicator  Sources and Coverage  Definition 
1. Access to 
Electricity Network 
(% of population) 
World Bank Energy Help Desk. Data collected 
from different household surveys and weighted 
by population. 
Coverage consists on data for the year 2000 
for 126 countries. 
Latest observations by country reported on 
table A1-1. 
Electricity access at the population level. It 
comprises commercially said electricity, both on-
grid and off-grid. It also includes self-generated 
electricity, for those countries where access to 
electricity has been assessed through surveys by 
government or government agencies. The data do 
not capture unauthorized connections (World 
Energy Outlook 2002, Annex 13.1 pag.35) 
2. Households 
Reporting Access to 
Electricity (% of 
households) 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS): 54 
countries with data. One/three surveys per 
country between 1990 and 2001. 
Rural/ urban and Wealth Group breakdown is 
provided by DHS. 
Latest observation by country reported on 
table A1-2. 
Electricity access at the household level. Refers to 
the percentage of households who answered   yes 
  to the question:   does your household have 
electricity  ? (DHS) 
3. Energy Use per 




World Development Indicators 2004: 121 
countries, 1980-2002 
 
Latest observation by country reported on 
table A1-3. 
Energy use refers to apparent consumption, which 
is equal to indigenous production plus imports and 
stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to 
ships and aircraft engaged in international 
transport. (International Energy Agency, and world 
Bank PPP data). Measure of energy intensity. 
Differences in this ratio over time and across 
countries reflect in part structural changes in the 
economy, changes in the energy efficiency of 
particular sectors, and differences in fuel mixes. 
(World Health Organization, IEA, The World Bank, 
WDI 2002, Table 3.8). 
AFFORDABILITY 
Indicator  Sources and Coverage  Definition 
4. Electricity 
Average End-User 
Prices (US ¢ kWh) 
International Energy Agency (IEA), Data 
Services: 29 OECD Countries, 1980-2003. 
Organizaci   n Lationoamericana de Energ   a 
(OLADE), Sistema de Informaci   n Econ   
mica Energ∅tica (SIEE): 25 LAC Countries, 
1980-2003. Energy Regulators Regional 
Association (ERRA):  17 Central and Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia countries, 2000- 2004. 
South African Development through Electricity 
(SAD-ELEC): 13 Southern and East Africa, as 
of February 2002. Total: 84 countries. 
Breakdown by residential and non-residential 
customers is available. 
Latest observation by country reported on 
table A1-4. 
End –user prices include transport costs to the 
consumer; are prices actually paid, i.e. net of 
rebates; include taxes which have to be paid by the 
consumer as part of the transaction and which are 
not refundable. This excludes value added tax. 
PERCEIVED QUALITY 





World Economic Forum Firm Level Surveys – 
Global Competitiveness Report 2002-2003: 82 
countries, 2001 and 2002. 
Latest observation by country reported on 
table a1-5. 
Weighted average of firm-perception ratings of 
quality services   based on a predetermined scale 
1 = worst 7 = best (WB INFVP)> Question in 
survey: Rank the quality of electricity supply in your 
country (in terms of lack of interruptions and lack of 
voltage fluctuations 1 = it is worse than most other 
countries, 7 = it is equal to the highest in the world. 
6. Commercial 
Perception of Public 
Agency Electricity 
Provider (index) 
World Bank – Firm Level Surveys, World 
Business Environment Survey 2000: 79 
countries, 2000. 
Latest observation by country reported on 
table A1-6. 
Weighted average of firm-perception ratings of 
quality services   based on a predetermined scale 
1 = worst 7 = best (WB INFVP). Question in survey: 
How would you rate the quality and efficiency of 
power public services? 
TECHNICAL QUALITY 
Indicator  Sources and Coverage  Definition 
7. Electric Power 
Transmission and 
Distribution Losses 
(% total output) 
World Development Indicators 2004: 124 
countries, 1980-2002. 
Latest observation by country reported on 
table A1-7. 
Technical and non-technical losses. Includes 
electricity losses due to operation of the system and 
the delivery of electricity as well as those caused by 
unmetered supply. This comprises all losses due to 
transport and distribution of electrical energy and 
heat (WB Energy Team). Electric power 
transmission and distribution losses include losses 
in transmission between sources of supply and 
points of distribution and in the distribution to 
consumers, including pilferage (WDI).  
 
Source : Estache and Goicoecha (2005)
49Water & Sanitation Indicators 
ACCESS 
Indicator Sources  and  Coverage  Definition 
1. Access to Improved Water 
Sources (% of population) 
Joint Monitoring Programme: 163-
175 countries, 1990 and 2002. 
 
Rural/urban breakdown is 
provided. 
 
Latest observation by country 
reported on table A2-1. 
‘Improved’ water supply technologies are: 
household connection, public standpipe, borehole, 
protected dug well, protected spring, rainwater 
collection. Availability of at least 20 litres per person 
per day, from a source within one kilometre of the 
user’s dwelling. ‘Not improved’ are: unprotected 
well, unprotected spring, vendor-provided water, 
bottled water (based on concerns about the quality 
of supplied water, not concerns over the water 
quality), and tanker truck-provided water. (World 
Health Organization and United Nations Children’s 
Fund, JMP report (2004), Geneva and New York 
(pp. 24-31)). 
2. Access to Improved 
Sanitation (% of population). 
Joint Monitoring Programme: 153-
160 countries, 1990 and 2002. 
 
Rural/urban breakdown is 
provided. 
 
Latest observation by country 
reported on table A2-2. 
‘Improved’ sanitation technologies are: connection 
to a public sewer, connection to septic system, 
pour-flush latrine, simple pit latrine, ventilated 
improved pit latrine. The excreta disposal system is 
considered adequate if it is private or shared (but 
not public) and if hygienically separates human 
excreta from human contact. ‘Not improved’ are: 
service or bucket latrines (where excreta are 
manually removed), public latrines, latrines with an 
open pit. (World Health Organization and United 
Nations Children’s Fund. JMP report (2004). 
Geneva and New York (pp. 24-31)). 
PERCEIVED QUALITY 
3.Commercial Perception of 
Water Service (index) 
World Bank-Firm Level Surveys, 
World Business Environment 
Survey 2000: 80 countries, 2000. 
 
Latest observation by country 
reported on table A2-3. 
Weighted average of firm-perception ratings of 
quality services   based on a predetermined scale 
1=worst 7=best (WB INFVP). Question in survey: 
How would you rate the quality and efficiency of 
water public services? 
TECHNICAL QUALITY 
Indicator Sources  and  Coverage  Definition 
4. Households Using Piped or 
Well Water as Main Source of 
Drinking Water (% of 
households) 
Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS): 55 countries, one/three 
surveys per country between 1990 
and 2002. 
 
Rural/urban breakdown is 
provided. 
 
Latest observation by country 
reported on tables A2-4. 
Percentage distribution of households according to 
major source of drinking water. Question in 
questionnaire asks   what’s the main source of 
drinking water for members of your household? 
Piped, Well, Surface, Rain, Tanker Truck, Bottled, 
or other   (DHS)> The options Piped and Well were 
aggregated to calculate this indicator. 
 
Source : Estache and Goicoecha (2005)
50ICT Performance Indicators 
ACCESS 




ITU-ICT Indicators: 203 countries, 
1980-2003. Latest observation by 
country reported on table A3-1. 
Total telephone (fixed mainlines plus cellular) 
subscribers per 1000 inhabitants (ICT Team). 
2. Mainlines Teledensity 
(Mainlines 
subscribers/1000 people). 
ITU-ICT Indicators: 203 countries, 
1980-2003. Latest observation by 
country reported on table A3-2. 
The number of fixed mainlines per 1000 inhabitants (ICT 
Team).  
Telephone mainlines are telephone lines connecting a 





ITU-ICT Indicators: 204 countries, 
1980-2003. Latest observation by 
country reported on table A3-3. 
Refers to users of portable telephones subscribing to an 
automatic public mobile telephone service which 
provides access to the Public Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN) using cellular technology. This can 
include analogue and digital cellular systems but should 
not include non-cellular systems. 
Subscribers to fixed wireless (e.g. Wireless Local Loop 
(WLL)), public mobile data services, or radio paging 
services are not included. Calculated by dividing the 
number of cellular mobile subscribers by the population 
and multiplying by 100 (ITU). 
4. Households with Own 
Telephone (% of 
households) 
Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS): 45 countries, one/three surveys 
per country between 1990 and 2002. 
Rural/urban breakdown is provided. 
:atest observation by country reported 
on table A3-5. 
Percentage of households possessing a telephone. 
Question in survey: Does your household have a 
telephone? Yes/no? 
AFFORDABILITY 
Indicator Sources  and  Coverage  Definition 
5. Cost of Local Phone Call 
(US cents/3 minutes) 
ITU-ICT Indicators: 196 countreis, 
1981-2003. 
Latest observation by country reported 
on table A3-6. 
Local call refers to the cost of a peak rate 3-minute fixed 
line call within the same exchange area using the 
subscriber’s own terminal (i.e. not from a public 
telephone).This indicator is expressed in US cents (ITU-
World Telecommunication Development Report). 
6. Cost of Phone Call to the 
US (US cents/3 minutes) 
World Development Indicators 2004: 
175 countries, 1996-2003. 
Latest observation by country reported 
on table A3-7. 
Cost of international call to U.S. is the cost of a three-
minute, peak rate, fixed line call from the country to the 
United States (ITU-World Telecommunication 
Development Report). 
7. Cost of Cellular Local 
Call (US cents/3 off-peak 
minutes) 
ITU-ICT Indicators: 195 countries, 
1980-2003. 
Latest observation by country reported 
on table A3-8. 
Cellular- cost of 3-minute local call (off-peak). Expressed 
in US cents (ITU). 
PERCEIVED QUALITY 
Indicator Sources  and  Coverage  Definition 




World Economic Forum-Firm Level 
Surveys, Global Competitiveness 
Report 2002-2003: 82 countries, 2001-
02. 
Latest observation by country reported 
on table A3-9. 
Weighted average of firm-perception ratings of quality of 
services based on a predetermined scale 1-worst 
7=best. 
The relevant question in the GCR survey is: New 
telephone lines in your business are 1=scarce and 
difficult to obtain, 7=widely available and highly reliable. 
9. Commercial Perception 
of Availability of Mobile or 
Cellular Telephone (index) 
World Economic Forum-Firm Level 
Surveys, Global Competitiveness 
Report 2002-2003: 82 countries, 2002-
02. 
Latest observation by country reported 
on table A3-10. 
Weighted average of firm-perception ratings of quality of 
services based on a predetermined scale 1=worst 
7=best. 
The relevant question in the GCR survey is: Mobile or 
cellular telephones for your business are 1=not 
available, 7=as accessible and affordable as in the 
world s most technologically advanced countries. 
10. Commercial Perception 
of Internet Access in 
Schools (index) 
World Economic Forum – Firm Level 
Surveys, Global Competitiveness 
Report 2002-2003: 82 countries, 2001-
02. 
Latest observation by country reported 
on table A3-11. 
Weighted average of firm-perception ratings of quality of 
services based on a predetermined scale 1=worst 7 = 
best. 
The relevant question in the GCR survey is: Internet 
access in schools is: 1=very limited, 7=pervasive- most 
children have frequent access. 
11. Commercial Perception 
of Postal Efficiency (index) 
World Economic Forum – Firm Level 
Surveys, Global Competitiveness 
Report 2002-2003: 82 countries, 2001-
2002. 
Weighted average of firm-perception ratings of quality of 
services based on a predetermined scale 1-worst 
7=best. 
The relevant question in the GCR survey is: Do you trust 
your country s postal system sufficiently to have a friend 
mail a small package work US$100 to you? 1=not at all, 
7 = yes, trust the system entirely. 
TECHNICAL QUALITY 
Indicator Sources  and  Coverage  Definition 
12. Phone Faults (reported 
faults/100 mainlines) 
ITU-ICT Indicators: 182 countries, 
1980-2002. 
This is calculated by dividing the total number of 
reported faults for the year by the total number of main 
Source : Estache and Goicoecha (2005)
51Transport Performance Indicators 
ACCESS 
Indicator  Sources and Coverage  Definition 
1.Road Density in Terms of 
Population (road-km/1000 
people) 
World Development Indicators 
2004: 184 countries, 1990-2002. 
 
Latest observations by country 
reported on table A4-1. 
It is the total road network in km divided by total 
population and multiplied by 1000 (INFVPFO).  
Total road network includes motorways, highways, and 
main or national roads, secondary or regional roads, and 
all other roads in a country. (International Road 
Federation, World Road Statistics). 
2. Road Density in Terms of 
Land (road-km/1000 sq km) 
World Development Indicators 
2004: 185 countries, 1990-2002. 
 
Latest observations by country 
reported on table A4-2. 
It is the total road network in km divided by total land 
area in sq km and multiplied by 1000 (INFVPFO). 
Total road network includes motorways, highways, and 
main or national roads, secondary or regional roads, and 
all other roads in a country. (Int. Road Federation, World 
Road Statistics). 
3. Rail Lines Density in Terms 
of Population (rail-km/1000 
people) 
World Development Indicators 
2004: 104 countries, 1995-2002.  
Only a few observations per year, 
except for 2000 and 2002. 
 
Latest observations by country 
reported on table A4-3. 
It is the total rail lines in km divided by total population 
and multiplied by 1000 (INFVPFO). Rail lines are the 
length of railway route available for train service, 
irrespective of the number of parallel tracks (World Bank, 
Transportation, Water, and Urban Development 
department, Transport Division). 
4. Rail Lines Denesity in Terms 
of Land (rain-km/1000 sqkm) 
World Development Indicators 
2004: 104 countries, 1995-2002. 
Only a few observations per year, 
except for 2000 and 2002. 
Latest observation by country 
reported on table A4-4. 
It is the total rail lines in km divided by total land area in 
sq km and multiplied by 1000 (INFVPFO)> Rail lines are 
the length of railway route available for train service, 
irrespective of the number of parallel tracks (World Bank, 
Transportation, Water, and Urban Development 
Department, Transport Division). 
PERCEIVED QUALITY 
Indicator  Sources and Coverage  Definition 
5. Travel Time to Work in Main 
Cities (minutes/one-way work 
trip) 
UN-Habitat: Available for 87 
countries, 1998. 
 
Latest observation by country 
reported on table A4-7. 
Average time in minutes for a one-way work trip. This is 
an average over all modes of transport (UN-Habitat)> In 
order to aggregate data at the country level simple 
averages of cities’ travel time to work were taken even 
though the list of cities was not exhaustive. A more 
accurate approach, should more data become available, 
would be to use averages weighted by city population 
with a comprehensive list of cities per country 
(INFVPFO). 
6.  Commercial Perception of 
Services Delivered by Road 
Department/Public Works 
(index). 
World Bank-Firm Level Surveys, 
World Business Environment 
Survey 2000: 80 countries, 2000. 
 
Latest observation by country 
reported on table A4-8. 
Weighted average of firm-perception ratings of services 
delivered by the Road Department/Public Works 1=worst 
7=best. 
The question in WBES 2000 is:   Please rate the overall 
quality and efficiency of services delivered by the Roads 
Department/Public Works.   
7.Commercial Perception of 
Port Facilities (index) 
World Economic Forum – Firm 
Level Surveys, Global 
Competitiveness Report 2002-
2003: 82 countries, 2001-02. 
 
Latest observation by country 
reported on table A4-9. 
Weighted average of firm perception ratings of quality 
services in port facilities based on a predetermined scale 
1=worst 7=best. The question in the GCR survey is:   
Rank from 1 to 7 port facilities and inland waterways in 
your country. 1=underdeveloped, 7=as developed as the 
world’s best.   
8. Commercial Perception of 
Railroad Services (index). 
World Economic Forum-Firm Level 
Surveys, Global Competitiveness 
Report 2002-2003: 82 countries, 
2001-02. 
Latest observation by country 
reported on table A4-10. 
Weighted average of firm-perception ratings of quality of 
railroad services based on a predetermined scale 
1=worst 7 = best. The relevant question is the GCR 
survey is: Rank from 1 to 7 the railroads in your country. 
1=underdeveloped. 7=as extensive and efficient as the 
world’s best. 
 
9. Commercial Perception of 
Air Transport Services (index). 
World Economic Forum-Firm Level 
Surveys, Global Competitiveness 
Report 2002-2003: 82 countries, 
2002-02. 
Latest observation by country 
reported on table A4-11. 
Weighted average of firm-perception ratings of quality of 
air transport services based on a predetermined scale 1 
= worst 7 = best. The relevant question in the GCR 
survey is: Rank from 1 to 7 air transport in your country. 
1 = infrequent and inefficient, 7 = as extensive and 
efficient as the world’s best. 
TECHNICAL QUALITY 
Indicator  Sources and Coverage  Definition 
10. Paved Roads (% of total 
roads) 
World Development Indicators 
2004: 178 countries, 1990-2002. 
Latest observation by country 
reported on table A4-12. 
Paved roads are those surfaced with crushed stone 
(macadam) and hydrocarbon binder or bitumiized 
agents, with concrete, or with cobblestones, as a 
percentage of all the country s roads, measured in 
length (WDI). 
 
Source : Estache and Goicoecha (2005)
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